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Executive Summary 
Introduction 
This report presents the findings of the Research Study into Outsourcing Grant Making. The 
aim of the research is: 
‘to increase BIG’s understanding of the rationale for outsourcing grant making 
and the circumstances under which it makes best sense for BIG to use this 
approach.’ 
This study considers the following forms of outsourcing used by the Big Lottery Fund (BIG): 
 Award Partner: where an organisation is selected to operate a funding programme on 
BIG's behalf 
 Portfolio: where a lead organisation applies to BIG and is responsible for the delivery 
of a group of projects 
 Trust: where a Trust is formed and enacted by a trust deed. Within the terms of the 
trust deed, the trust is able to distribute the funding. 
The study considered 22 programmes, all launched since 2004 and with a combined value 
of £1.082 billion. This is made up of six award partners with a value of £263 million, nine 
portfolios with a value of £419 million and seven trusts with a value of £400 million. 
BIG has identified the following areas where there are benefits in it using an outsourced 
approach to better achieve its mission: greater value for money; greater reach; and to 
enhance learning. 
Understanding Outsourcing 
There is rich and well-developed literature on outsourcing. Interviews with staff in BIG 
implicitly reflected on many of the issues raised in the wider literature: managing costs, 
achieving strategic objectives, and the importance of relationships and tight contract 
management. The wider literature on outsourcing pointed to:  
 rationales for outsourcing: the main private sector rationales appear to be cost 
reduction and efficiency improvements. Second-order factors are improvements to 
wider business performance, to exploit the capacity of an outsourcing provider, to divest 
the organisation of a problem, or to follow the lead of others 
 success factors in outsourcing include: careful selection of which functions to 
outsource; involvement (and building) of cross-organisational teams; understanding and 
management of all relevant costs (direct, indirect and opportunity costs); contract 
duration, detail and flexibility; managing relationships; and retaining key skills within the 
outsourcing organisation.  
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But BIG’s concern and approach entail some important different issues from those described 
in the literature. These tend to arise from the fact that BIG is a non-profit organisation. 
Nonetheless, broad principles in terms of cost and strategy provide some lessons. 
A further issue, which also occurs in the literature, is that in the case of Trusts and Award 
Partners, BIG is relinquishing its direct relationship with its (third sector) grant holders (its 
'customers') and enabling another organisation control of grant distribution for a programme. 
Lessons from BIG’s Experience of Outsourcing  
Four overarching lessons emerged from the research into individual programmes: 
 BIG has sophisticated approaches and substantial capacity for the development 
and delivery of programmes which largely, but not entirely, apply to all forms of 
outsourced programme. BIG's own systems and capacity for programme delivery were 
frequently more developed than those of the partner organisations it contracted with 
 BIG's approach to outsourcing has evolved and lessons have been learned. Good 
programme development was the key to subsequent relationship management issues 
and such practices have improved 
 BIG could usefully do more to consider how outsourcing might affect its position 
in relation to wider policy fields, including the question of how far BIG does and 
should align its policy objectives with those of its partners. 
 partner organisations had their own strategies, motivations and objectives which may 
include delivering a programme on behalf of BIG to promote a particular issue, gain 
competitive advantage and market position, and secure resources 
 outsourcing provides BIG with a mechanism to manage its Lottery funding 
balances, particularly through the scheduling of large programme payments to partners, 
although it does not necessarily provide a means to release funding quickly. 
Costs of Outsourcing 
Lottery distributors are under increasing pressure to deliver grants in the most cost-
efficient and effective way possible. Evidence from this and other research provides 
evidence on the costs of different models of grant making. 
Grantmaking costs 
On the whole it usually costs more (per £ of grant) to administer low value grants, smaller 
grant programmes and grants to individuals.  
When compared with other lottery distributors and grantmaking foundations operating in a 
similar field, the Big Lottery Fund's administrative costs appear reasonable and 
proportionate. Outsourcing grantmaking functions is uncommon among funders, but where it 
does exist the administration costs appear proportionately higher than in-house grantmaking. 
BIG has access to economies of scale and scope that enables it to keep costs down. 
Nonetheless, the rationale for outsourcing programmes includes purchasing additional 
expertise, reaching harder to reach groups and individuals, and to innovating, so it is likely 
that such economies may diminish – and the added value of outsourcing may increase. 
Outsourced Grantmaking Costs 
The costs of outsourced grantmaking are more complex than in-house grantmaking; not 
least because programme development and operating/administrative costs are borne by 
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both BIG and its delivery partners. BIG's development and operational costs tend to be 
outside the programme budget whereas partner costs tend to be within it. Nonetheless, we 
found the following: 
 development costs: For most outsourced programmes the chosen delivery partner 
receives a development grant from BIG to develop their business plan for the 
programme in more detail. Development grants are currently limited to £250,000 and 
account for a small fraction (typically less than one per cent) of the overall programme 
costs, and represent necessary expenditure for the outsourced partner, although in 
some cases BIG could have developed a broadly comparable in-house programme 
more cheaply 
 BIG development and support costs: BIG also incurs costs during the development 
and delivery of an outsourced programme. For programmes currently in development 
BIG estimates these costs through a generic template for developing an operating cost 
budget. Our findings suggest that the cost to BIG of managing outsourced programmes 
is relatively low as a proportion of the total programme budget: less than five per cent in 
the examples we explored 
 programme delivery costs: As with in-house programmes, the majority of the cost 
associated with outsourced programmes is incurred at the programme delivery stage. 
Our findings suggest that these costs can be anything from four per cent of programme 
expenditure for larger outsourced programmes to 14 per cent for smaller programmes. 
However, these costs did not always include expenditure incurred by delivery agents 
administering grants at levels below the outsourced partner. In addition, we found a cost 
advantage from the trust model, which through expendable endowments typically 
generated (or were hoped to generate) investment returns sufficient to cover direct 
delivery costs. These returns were directly used to increase the programme budget. Of 
course, BIG also generates interest on its balances, although such interest is most likely 
to be used to benefit subsequent programmes.   
The data on costs can be qualified by interview respondents. Three general sets of 
comments were made. First, that development costs incurred by partners in the 
development of outsourced arrangement were only partly met by BIG; second, that delivery 
costs were generally seen to be reasonable; and third, previous delivery of programmes for 
BIG helped partners better meet BIG's needs.  
Conclusion 
Our research into the costs of grantmaking demonstrates that outsourcing grantmaking is 
likely to result in greater operational costs than in-house delivery due to extra layers of 
administrative and other transactional costs involved. Moreover, BIG may lose such 
economies of scale by outsourcing. However, there are exceptions to this, notably the £200 
million Big Local Trust which has lower proportionate costs than other Trusts. 
Under the current treatment of costs there is also the potential of a perverse incentive to 
outsource. Administrative costs incurred by partner organisations can be treated as 
programme and not operational expenditure under BIG's accounting rules and therefore may 
mask the true cost delivering grants through this route. 
BIG's Outsourced Approaches 
There was considerable variation within approaches, with few programmes or approaches 
being entirely alike. Nonetheless, they did contain common features, notably the importance 
of good and tight contracts (and in the case of trusts, trust deeds), well-specified 
programmes and of relationship management. 
 iv 
This research study found that each outsourced model did indeed bring benefits including 
access to expertise, infrastructure and reach (BIG's current rationale for outsourcing). 
However, this alone does not provide a case for these types of outsourcing (for instance 
expertise could also be sourced through support and development contracts) nor necessarily 
the rationale for which outsourcing approach should be used. These issues are explored 
further in the main research report and are subject of a decision-making model, developed 
alongside this research.   
Each outsourcing model has particular advantages as outlined below: 
 Trusts enable BIG to address a need over the longer term (over five years) where such 
a commitment is required for change, and by being able to deliver activities which BIG 
cannot or would find it difficult to do, including micro grants, loans and grants to 
individuals, or community development and capacity-building work that is needed to 
achieve further outcomes for particular disadvantaged groups 
 Award Partners worked well where partner organisations had access to a particular 
group and technical expertise or could provide effective support to applicants and grant-
holders. Effective award partners have expertise in grant-making, particularly in 
ensuring appropriate grant management, supporting capacity and handling assessment 
and monitoring. It was noted that BIG's requirement for Award Partners to comply with 
its grant making system Merlin had sometimes added unforeseen processes to grant 
management 
 Portfolios do not involve BIG delegating grant making and management powers.  They 
enable BIG to deliver a broad strategy which includes support across policy fields. They 
were also found to be effective in promoting networking and leverage of additional funds. 
The research found a range of practice in terms of outsourcing, and this suggested lessons 
for its further development. As with in-house programmes, good programme development 
was of critical importance. The risks of poorly specified programmes which were outsourced 
were greater and as experience of a small number of programmes showed, resulted in 
considerable unforeseen additional management, legal and audit costs.  
Relationships between BIG and partners mattered, and were valued by partners. Again, 
interviews, evaluations and Lessons Learned papers highlighted the importance of good and 
tight specification of programmes with tight contracts and good communication. 
All models provided the basis for innovation in some way, although a critical issue here was 
the importance of capturing lessons for future programmes and for wider policy impact.  
All models relied on external expertise existing or being able to be built to deliver the 
programme. Where this is not the case or BIG has concerns in this area, then consideration 
of in-house delivery needs to be made. 
Conclusion: lessons from the research 
We conclude from our study: 
1. Actual costs of developing and delivering programmes are ultimately higher than 
expected in many outsourced programmes. This is for a variety of reasons, but key 
factors are to do with additional costs incurred following programme launch. Some of 
these could have been anticipated and addressed at the programme design stage. 
However, it was found that costs had reduced with successive programmes, suggesting 
considerable learning from experience.  
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2. Relationship management is an important component of effective delivery of 
outsourced grant making. BIG's practices in this field have evolved with a dedicated 
team in place for high value/low volume contracts. Nonetheless, interview respondents 
in BIG reflected on the implications of 'losing control' of grant making, to some extent in 
award partners and almost entirely in trusts.  
3. Outsourcing grantmaking does not occur in a policy vacuum: BIG outsources to 
help meet its mission, and in doing so works with other organisations that have their 
own missions, priorities and relationships. BIG needs to recognise the tensions that can 
arise from this both at operational and delivery level but also in terms of BIG's wider role 
as a policy actor.  
4. Outsourcing arrangements are typically long term and may cover different 
programmes. This presents operational issues for BIG in terms of ensuring continuity in 
relationships and also in understanding the full life-cycle of outsourcing.  
5. There is an assumption by BIG and its partners that outsourcing brings access to 
expertise and with this the benefits of reach and innovation. Whilst evidence was 
found of both, this was not always the case. Outsourced partners enabled BIG to do 
things it might not be able to do in achieving its mission, for instance awarding grants to 
individuals, forms of social investment and support at the boundary between social and 
economic interventions. However, BIG is often equally able to innovate through in-
house programmes and has more flexibility here to adapt in-house programmes during 
delivery stages.  
6. Outsourcing grant making provides BIG with a means to manage and forecast 
future expenditure. Trusts and Award Partners enable BIG to release funding in large 
tranches. While it used to take BIG up to three years to develop new Trust programmes, 
it now typically takes 12 to 18 months – a situation that may make this benefit more 
attractive. 
7. BIG has experienced some unsuccessful outsourced arrangements and it has drawn 
lessons from these, from evaluation evidence, Lessons Learned papers, and internal 
and external audit. The main lesson is the importance of robust programme 
development in highlighting and addressing unresolved issues at programme launch, as 
well as fully testing the capacity of partners to deliver. 
8. A rationale for outsourcing is that it enables BIG to reach target groups with particular 
needs, and so to help deliver outcomes. Reach may either be through expertise, 
through access and legitimacy, or through building capacity. The concern here is that 
decisions about whether to outsource need not just consider reach and outcomes, but 
also the likelihood and scale of impact. But while these are important concerns, BIG 
also needs to consider how effective partners and approaches adopted will be at 
achieving change, and what the scale of that change will be. 
9. This research study does not provide a full evaluation of different models of 
outsourcing or a comparison with in-house delivery. It has provided an assessment 
of costs, appropriate processes, and where possible identified evidence of reach and 
outcomes. The report outlines suggestions for how this might be addressed in the future. 
10. This research finds that it is appropriate for BIG to continue to have a balance 
between programmes managed in-house and programmes which are delivered 
through a range of outsourced arrangements. The main lessons are that decisions 
around outsourcing, and the subsequent practice of outsourcing, can be improved and 
continue to build on an extensive base of research evidence and experience. 
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Recommendations 
1. BIG should continue to ensure that the capacity of partner organisations to deliver 
programmes, and where necessary to make grants, remains a central consideration in 
decisions to outsource. 
2. In deciding whether to outsource, BIG should undertake more explicit and formal 
consideration of questions of outcomes and impact, noting in particular 
assumptions and evidence about how outsourcing will enhance these. 
3. BIG should work closely with partner organisations to ensure effective recording and 
sharing of lessons, evidence of performance, and progress towards outcomes 
and impact. Evaluations, monitoring information and stakeholder consultation and 
feedback are all of great value. BIG should work closely with partners to ensure that 
systems developed meet both BIG’s and partners’ needs. 
4. Relationships between BIG and organisations running outsourced programmes 
are an essential factor for success and should be managed at three distinct levels: 
 customer relationship management at an operational level 
 continuing relationships with other functions, notably to manage BIG’s 
requirements in regard to such questions as branding, publicity, external relations 
and public accountability, and evaluation and learning 
 higher-level strategic relationships between BIG and its partners as to how Lottery 
funding can be most effectively used to deliver BIG's mission, involving senior staff 
on both sides. 
BIG should also ensure that there is appropriate internal communication to ensure 
consistent approaches. 
5. BIG should ensure that it pays sufficient attention to relationship management 
throughout the lifecycle of outsourced approaches. To avoid risks to BIG’s 
reputation, it is particularly important to consider arrangements for programme closure 
and ending relationships. 
6. All BIG staff involved in working with partners running outsourced programmes should 
be aware of the specific nature and boundaries of the arrangements in place. This 
is particularly important for staff working with Trusts, given the very different legal and 
working arrangements that they entail. 
7. BIG should define relationships with outsourcing partners more widely than 
through a narrow set of programme delivery issues. These relationships might best 
be seen as types of strategic alliances. 
8. Consideration about whether to outsource should explicitly consider such issues as 
BIG’s wider strategic role, reputation and brand. 
9. BIG should make decisions about whether to outsource on the basis of evidence 
and documented considerations. Doing this requires input from BIG staff, committees 
and stakeholders. The software developed alongside this research study is a resource 
that will facilitate this process; its use should be promoted through the funding 
development framework. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1. Introduction 
This report presents the findings of the Research Study into Outsourcing Grant 
Making.  
The aim of the research is: 
‘to increase BIG’s understanding of the rationale for outsourcing grant 
making and the circumstances under which it makes best sense for BIG to 
use this approach’ 
The research also considers whether there are other approaches to outsourcing 
grant making, which might be considered in the future. The research was conducted 
between October 2011 and March 2012.  
The Big Lottery Fund (BIG) is the largest distributor of funds from the National 
Lottery. BIG is sponsored by the Office for Civil Society and operates across all four 
countries of the UK. BIG's mission states that it is committed to bringing real 
improvements to communities and to the lives of people most in need.  
BIG uses a range of approaches to distribute funds. One approach is outsourcing, 
where BIG makes use of another organisation or other organisations to undertake 
some or all of the grant making and management process. This study considers the 
following forms of outsourcing: 
 Award Partner: where an organisation is selected to operate a funding 
programme on BIG's behalf. Grant administration including distribution is 
undertaken by award partner to agreed standards including the provision of 
management information to BIG 
 Portfolio: where a lead organisation applies to BIG and is responsible for the 
delivery of a group of projects. Project selection is undertaken by BIG and the 
portfolio manager will be responsible for ensuring the delivery of projects, 
providing aggregated management information to BIG 
 Trust: where a Trust is formed and enacted by a trust deed. Within the terms of 
the trust deed, the trust is able to distribute the funding. The trust is independent 
of BIG although the trust deed will state the terms of the relationship between 
the parties (e.g., around branding and management information). 
The study considered 22 programmes all launched since 2004 with a combined value 
of £1.082 billion. This is made up of six award partners with a value of £263 million, 
nine portfolios with a value of £419 million and seven trusts with a value of £400 
million. Summary details of the programmes are contained in Annex 1.  
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1.2. Rationale for Outsourcing 
As the largest distributor of Lottery funds, BIG has developed sophisticated 
processes for the in-house development and implementation of programmes. For 
programmes which have a wide variety and high volume of applications, there is 
likely to be considerable value in BIG doing its own grant making. Its size also gives 
it economies of scale and scope as well as considerable knowledge around the 
management of programme development and implementation.  
However, BIG has identified the following areas where there are benefits in it using 
an outsourced approach to better achieve its mission: 
 outsourcing provides greater value for money enabling BIG to realise 
efficiency savings and thus to retain and strengthen its focus on those most in 
need 
 outsourcing may offer greater reach, again helping it to better target funding to 
those in greatest need 
 outsourcing may enhance learning, and in particular enable BIG to use the 
relationships, expertise, and reputation of a third party. 
1.3. Research Objectives 
The research study has the following five objectives: 
i. To test BIG's assumptions about the rationale and benefits for outsourcing 
outlined above, by exploring a selection of outsourced activity over the last five 
years 
ii. To produce a working model that will allow BIG to compare the costs of running 
outsourced and in-house programmes or grant making functions and thereby 
determine value for money 
iii. To identify what approaches are used to make the most of outsourcing 
organisations' expertise and to maximise reach 
iv. To provide evidence of the positive and negative impact of outsourcing in terms 
of value for money, reach and third party expertise 
v. To advise BIG on the circumstances when outsourcing of some or all of its 
funding powers would be appropriate, and the factors it should take into account 
in determining this.  
Objective ii. is briefly considered in this report with the model outlined in a separate 
document and associated spread sheets. 
1.4. Study Approach and Limitations 
The following research methods have been used: 
i. Scoping interviews with staff from across BIG, including policy, programme, 
legal, audit, finance, operational and country teams 
ii. Two separate literature reviews: one on approaches to outsourcing from other 
contexts (including private and public sectors and of other functions); and of 
outsourcing used by other grantmakers 
iii. Research into 23 programmes which have been 'outsourced' in some way. This 
strand of the research included interviews with programme management staff in 
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BIG, the lead contact in the outsourced organisation and a review of associated 
documentation (including programme guidance, evaluation reports, audit reports, 
lessons learned reports and management information on costs and outcomes). 
There were three main limiting factors to the study. Firstly, we did not undertake 
research with final grant recipients to solicit their views although we have drawn on 
evaluation reports where available. Secondly, many of the outsourced arrangements 
are relatively new with some still in negotiation stage. Thirdly, and more generally, 
we did not undertake a full evaluation of outsourcing, which include a full cost benefit 
analysis. This could potentially be done in the future through a comparative study of 
a small set of in-house and outsourced programmes which have a common theme.  
1.5. Report Structure 
The report is structured as follows: 
 Section 2: Understanding Outsourcing Grantmaking provides an overview of 
the conceptual underpinning of outsourcing decisions, lessons from other grant 
makers, and how cost and value should be considered 
 Section 3: Approaches to Outsourcing presents findings on trusts, award 
partners and portfolios as used by the Big Lottery Fund 
 Section 4: Lessons from Outsourcing considers findings on how outsourcing 
is managed within the Big Lottery Fund 
 Section 5: Costs of Outsourcing compares the costs of developing and 
implementing programmes using different grant making models 
 Section 6: Conclusion: lessons and recommendations.  
The report also contains three annexes: 
 Annex 1: Outline Details of Outsourced Programmes considered in this 
study 
 Annex 2: Lessons and Value Added from outsourced programmes 
 Annex 3: Case Studies of outsourced programmes. 
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2. Understanding Outsourcing Grantmaking 
2.1. Introduction 
This section of the report compares the rationale BIG has for outsourcing with the 
wider literature on outsourcing. Outsourcing has a very well established literature. It 
primarily focuses on outsourcing in manufacturing and of particular functions 
(especially information technology services and support), with some interest in 
frameworks to understand outsourcing in the public sector.1 Outside of the public 
sector, there is very little consideration of outsourcing in the third sector, except for a 
small US literature on charitable foundations' use of outsourcing to make grants.2  
2.2. Conceptual Underpinning of Outsourcing 
The earliest examples of frameworks being developed to consider outsourcing date 
from the 1950s and focus on quantitative approaches applied to guide manufacturing 
firms' decisions as to whether they should 'make' or 'buy'.3  
However, from the 1970s, transaction costs have become the most established 
approach for considering outsourcing. This follows Williamson's transaction cost 
economics models. Williamson's transaction cost approach seeks to understand 
decision making around the nature of contractual relationships and organisational 
structures and roles: that is the relationship between governance structures (for 
instance the capacity of the outsourced partner and how it is contracted) and the 
attributes of the transaction (for instance the goals of a programme).4  
Transaction cost approaches go beyond a narrow consideration of cost issues. The 
following set out the main problems with any transactional relationship such as 
outsourcing: 
 bounded rationality of organisations and how outsourcing decisions are seen 
as transactions to reduce or at least manage costs and risks effectively 
 opportunism, on the part of the contracting and contracted organisations 
pursuing their self-interest 
                                               
1
 For an overview see: Cordella, A. and Willcocks, L. (2010) Outsourcing bureaucracy and public value: 
Reappraising the notion of the "contract state”. Government Information Quarterly, 27, pp. 82-88.  
2
 See for example, Snow, P. (2011) Sorting out the Differences between Private Foundations and Donor-Advised 
Funds, Investments and Wealth Monitor May/June pp. 33-35.  
3
 See for example Culliton, J.W. (1956) Make or Buy: A Consideration of the Problems Fundamental to a 
Decision Whether to Manufacture or Buy Materials, Accessory Equipment, Fabricating Parts and Suppliers. 
Harvard Business Research; and Higgins, C. (1955) Make-or-buy re-examined. Harvard Business Review, 33 (3) 
pp. 132-139. A more recent example of the quantitative approach to outsourcing decision making is in: Liou, 
J.J.H., Wang, H.S., Hsu, C.C., and Yin, S.L. (2011) A hybrid model for selection of an outsourcing partner.  
Applied Mathematical Modelling, 35, pp. 5121-5133. 
4
 See for example: Williamson, O.E. (1979) Transaction-cost Economics: the governance of contractual 
relationships. Journal of Law and Economics, 22 (2), pp. 233-261; Williamson, O.E. (1981) The Economics of 
Organization: The Transaction Cost Approach. American Journal of Sociology, 87 (3), pp. 548-577; and 
Williamson, O.E. (2008) Outsourcing: Transaction Cost Economics and Supply Chain Management. Journal of 
Supply Chain Management, 44 (2) pp. 5-16. 
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 small numbers bargaining whereby it is not possible for the contracting 
organisation to effectively obtain full information, and 
 asymmetric information between both contracting parties.5 
Each of these would appear to have some power in explaining outsourcing issues at 
the Big Lottery Fund (BIG). For instance, an example of bounded rationality is that 
BIG has limited (relative to other organisations) understanding of the technical 
aspects of some of its programmes (whether this is to do with reach to a 
disadvantaged group or to do with environmental technologies). Conversely, as an 
example of opportunism, although BIG engages with other organisations on a 
collaborative and partnership basis, different organisations will have sometimes 
competing and rivalrous missions and aims. This is not a reason against outsourcing 
but an issue which may have cost implications, which are subsequently revealed 
through additional contracting and relationship management costs. 
Whilst BIG distributes to grants to thousands of organisations each year, it engages a 
relatively small number of outsourced partners (an example of small numbers 
bargaining). As a result, it has a smaller pool of information on their performance and 
makes investments with the assistance of audit, due diligence and assessment 
procedures, as well the role of governance arrangements to effectively select 
outsourced partner organisations. However, it does so without perfect information 
and therefore any decision is also risk based. 
Other models developed to understand and to guide outsourcing decisions consider 
both comparative advantage (typically where there are cost benefits to outsourcing to 
a third country) and competitive advantage (and notably the importance of 
organisational factors).6 In broad terms, in a market situation private organisations 
may act to secure objectives such as market share over short term profit 
maximisation. This may appear to be a less relevant consideration to BIG, as a not 
for profit organisation. However, it may wish to seek to retain its pre-eminent position 
in grant distribution for strategic reasons.  
More recent research (from the 1990s onwards) has sought to understand 
outsourcing in terms of the core competences of an organisation, and therefore see 
outsourcing as seen as a strategic business decision. This is in response to 
perceived weaknesses of the transaction cost based approach and was supported 
by survey evidence over the last 20 years that relatively few firms saw high levels of 
benefits from outsourcing and that decisions were rarely taken within a thoroughly 
strategic perspective.7  
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 See for example the work of Ronan McIvor on practical frameworks for understanding outsourcing decisions: 
McIvor, R. (2000) A practical framework for understanding the outsourcing process.  Supply Chain Management: 
An International Journal, 5, (1), pp. 22-36; McIvor, R. (2009) How the transaction cost and resource-based 
theories of the firm inform outsourcing evaluation. Journal of Operations Management, 27, pp. 45-63;and, McIvor, 
R. (2008) What is the right outsourcing strategy for your process? European Management Journal, 26, pp. 24-34. 
See also Sanders, N.R., Locke, A., Moore, C.M., and Autry, C.W. (2007) A Multidimensional Framework for 
Understanding Outsourcing Arrangements. Journal of Supply Chain Management, Fall, pp. 3-15; Vining, A. and 
Globerman, S. (1999) A Conceptual Framework for Understanding the Outsourcing Decision. European 
Management Journal, 17, (6), pp. 645-654; and Kettler, K. and Walstrom, J. (193) The Outsourcing Decision' 
International Journal of Information Management, 13, pp. 449-459.  
6
 Prahalad, C.K. and Hamel, G. (1990) The Core Competence of the Corporation. Harvard Business Review, 
July-August, pp. 79-91. Arnold, U. (2000) New dimensions of outsourcing: a combination of transaction cost 
economics and the core competences approach. European Journal of Purchasing and Supply Management, 6, 
pp. 23-29.  
7
 See for example, PA Consulting Group (1996) International Strategic Sourcing Survey, London: PA Consulting, 
and Lonsdale, C. and Cox, A. (2000) The historical development of outsourcing: the latest fad? Industrial 
Management and Data Systems, 100 (9), pp. 444-450.  
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Put simply, the core competence approach argues that organisations protect core 
competences and only seek to outsource more peripheral functions. At face value 
this appears consistent with the approach which has emerged at BIG where a key 
driver for outsourcing has become the need to use specialist expertise and know-
how which BIG may not have, the importance of delivering programmes cost 
effectively, but also to protect its brand value (notably the trust that other 
organisations have in it as a grant maker).  
Research in the late 2000s begins to recognise the following trends in how 
outsourcing is understood: 
a. outsourcing may take different forms in relation to strategy and cost (i.e. it is not 
just a 'make' or 'buy' decision and may involve some form of partnering)8 
b. greater attention is being paid to outsourcing as a strategic and not an 
operational decision. Decisions are therefore taken in line with an organisation's 
longer term goals and its mission, rather than shorter term expedient reasons 
such as cost reduction. Outsourcing is then managed at a strategic rather than 
operational level9 
c. a consistent theme to emerge from the literature is around the importance of 
relationships, and therefore of relationship management. 10  More specifically, 
there is some research evidence which flags up the prominence of contracts 
and what is termed 'tight contracts'11 
d. attention is also being given to the timescales of decisions and organisational 
trajectories. Again, this indicates that outsourcing needs to be seen over a 
longer time scale, and longer than the length of individual contracts or 
programmes. Reflecting on this, some research has explored how outsourcing 
may evolve over time and how different approaches may emerge.  For instance, 
there is evidence that there are various learning curves required for successful 
outsourcing and that outsourcing competences that need to be built (from 
contracts and legal support, IT and strategic capacity). Moreover, it cannot be 
assumed that successful outsourcing can be achieved immediately12 
e. there is an interesting literature on ending outsourcing relationships and the 
risks of not planning for this or doing so strategically. This may take the form of 
additional costs (for instance legal, audit and management costs) but also in 
terms of the damage to an organisation's reputation and brand value13 
f. following this, some research has sought to consider service and manufacturing 
outsourcing decisions separately, in the former, the outsourcer is likely to be 
relinquishing some of its direct relationship with the customer, while in the latter 
this is unlikely to be the case14 
g. there is some acknowledgement that much of the debate crosses academic 
disciplinary approaches (such as accounting, economics, strategic management, 
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systems approaches). The relevance of this is that outsourcing decisions often 
need cross-team working and the combination of different specialisms.15 
In summary there appear different rationales and 'success factors' which can be 
drawn from the literature. These include: 
 rationales for outsourcing: the main private sector rationales appear to be 
around cost reduction and efficiency improvements. Second order factors 
considered are improvements to wider business performance, to exploit the 
capacity of an outsourcing provider, to divest the organisation of a problem 
including the transference of risk, or to follow the lead of others 
 success factors include: careful selection of which functions to outsource; 
involvement (and building) of teams from across the organisation; the 
understanding and management of all relevant costs (direct, indirect and 
opportunity costs); contract duration, detail and flexibility; the management of 
relationships; and retention of key skills within the outsourcing organisation.  
Outsourcing arrangements were also found to be improved where decisions went 
beyond a narrow assessment of costs.16 Further success factors therefore included 
decisions where the outsourcing arrangement would enable the organisation to 
change the operating environment (e.g. to provide new products or services), to 
manage service demand (e.g. to target a particular group) and to develop new 
systems for work (e.g. to innovate through a joint venture).  
2.3. Relevance of Outsourcing Concepts to BIG 
There is a rich and well developed literature on outsourcing and this review has only 
touched the surface. Interestingly, interviews with staff in BIG spoke implicitly of 
many of the issues (e.g. core competences, expediency vs. strategy) raised in the 
literature. It also appears that the literature helps to provide a strategic and 
conceptual framework for understanding outsourcing, even for the very specific 
context of grant making. 
Outsourcing of grant making by the BIG Lottery Fund involves some important 
differences with the mainstream literature. The BIG Lottery Fund is a non-
departmental public body (NDPB), a non-profit organisation whose mission and 
approach focus on reach and social outcomes. Nonetheless, both the cost and 
strategy type approaches provide some lessons, albeit with greater acceptance that 
BIG’s outcomes are not measured in financial terms (or necessarily quantitatively).  
A further issue is that BIG is relinquishing its direct relationship with its (third sector) 
grant holders (its 'customers') but enabling another organisation control of grant 
distribution for a programme. This raises some shorter term branding issues and 
questions of whether retaining the BIG brand on all relevant funds is important, but 
also longer term issues around BIG's position in both the grant making landscape 
and broader third sector policy agendas.  
There are some lessons from the literature about widening the scope of decision 
making beyond cost and value/outcome factors. These include considerations of: 
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 strategy (how BIG sets its strategic objectives)  
 core competence (around delivery of large programmes of grant funding to third 
sector organisations) 
 market position (as the largest grant maker in the UK, but entering a period 
when new approaches to funding such as social investment might be required)  
 risks (e.g. establishing a pool of rival grant makers) 
 issues of time (short term delivery vs. longer term interventions to change the 
policy field) 
 of (organisational) learning and partnership (it appears that outsourcing practice 
improves with experience) 
 relationships with partners and the management of these. 
2.4. Lessons from Outsourcing in Other Grantmakers 
Formal outsourcing of grant making functions by UK funders does not appear to be 
widespread, compared to for example practice in the US or in international aid 
programmes. An initial review has revealed the following. 
2.4.1. Government funds 
The majority of Government funding programmes targeted towards voluntary and 
community sector organisations are outsourced in one way or another, including a 
significant number that are currently being delivered by the Big Lottery Fund's non-
lottery funding operation, the Big Fund. Recent examples include Transforming Local 
Infrastructure, Transition Fund (both Cabinet Office) and MyPlace (Department for 
Education in England). Other prominent funders in receipt of outsourced Government 
funds include Social Investment Business (Futurebuilders, Department of Health 
Social Enterprise Investment Fund, Social Action Fund) and Community 
Development Foundation (Grassroots Grants). 
2.4.2. Other public funds 
Other (non-central Government) public sector bodies often outsource their grant 
programmes. For example, local authorities in former Neighbourhood Renewal Areas 
often outsourced their Small Grants programmes to local CVSs or Community 
Foundations. Local arrangements for the administration of the Children's' Fund also 
often involved elements of outsourcing. Likewise the Regional Development 
Agencies occasionally outsourced specific voluntary and community sector funds, for 
example the Yorkshire Forward investment in Charity Bank in the North delivered 
between Charity Bank and Key Fund. A further example is the ESF Global Grants 
Programme (2000-2006) which enabled small organisations to access ESF funds 
through grants administered via local intermediaries (such as Community 
Foundations). 
2.4.3. Other funds 
Some large grant making trusts and benevolent foundations outsource the 
administration of their grant application and award process to specialist grant 
administration organisations. One such example is Charis Grants, who administer a 
range of grant programmes for a number of Energy and Utility Trusts. 
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2.4.4. What are the rationales and benefits associated with outsourced grantmaking? 
Different rationales for outsourcing grantmaking functions emerge from the material 
reviewed: 
 economy and efficiency: for some funders it is more economic and efficient for 
them to outsource the grantmaking process to third parties. This is particularly 
the case when a grant management company can provide a Trust with 
significant economies of scale and handle a large volume of applicants and 
awards. An example here is Charis Grants which applies common application 
and administration processes to a number of Energy and Utility Trust grant 
programmes, thus reducing the 'unit cost' of awarding a grant 
 expertise/impact/reach: certain funders have expertise in a specific type or 
field of grant making/funding. For example the Government works with BIG to 
administer high volume generalist voluntary and community sector funding 
programmes due to their expertise, track record and established systems in this 
area. The Office for Civil Society has contracted the Social Investment Business 
for similar reasons (when looking to provide loan based funding). Likewise, local 
authorities choose to work with CVSs/Community Foundations when making 
small grants because they have processes already in place to deliver these 
types of programme. In these examples the decision to outsource funding to 
experts in a particular field is also likely to be motivated by the need to achieve 
maximum reach and impact through the funding 
 expediency: sometimes outsourcing grantmaking provides the funding provider 
with expediency, particularly if the funding is in support of a particular or time 
sensitive policy or strategy imperative. This includes cases where Government 
has needed to make a funding programme operational within a particular time 
period, and does not have the time or capacity to implement the programme 
themselves, or establish a suitable delivery vehicle. An example here includes 
the Government's 'Real Help for Communities' funding programmes (in 
response to the recession), which were delivered by existing fund holders such 
Capacitybuilders and Futurebuilders. 
Although there is a relatively small literature on outsourcing grant making in the 
United Kingdom, there is some evidence that it is being used more by government, 
private foundations and third sector organisations. However, there is no available 
evaluation evidence or performance data to suggest which approaches are most 
effective and when.  
2.5. Understanding Cost and Value 
When BIG makes decisions about whether to outsource, it needs not only to take 
account of its own current practice and standards, but also current best practice in 
outsourced grant-making and indeed wider approaches to outsourcing across private, 
public and third sectors. 
Considering costs in making this decisions about outsourcing needs to be based 
upon an appropriate selection of bases across two sets of factors. 
The first set of factors includes: 
 conventional accounting measures based upon financial costs and benefits: this 
looks at the conventional cost or financial benefit of outsourcing 
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 social impact measures relating to both social cost and social income: these 
measures focus on how effective and reliable the approach is in achieving or 
enhancing outcomes 
 brand development in the sense of service user engagement, positioning and 
relationship and profile building, all of which can enhance future effectiveness 
and growth. 
The first two points are covered in, amongst other sources, the REDF models for 
Total Cost Accounting. (REDF are the original authors of Social Return on 
Investment).  The third arises from more recent original research into non-profit 
transactional decision-making by Jim Clifford at Cass Centre for Charity 
Effectiveness, which is also taking further the concepts of measurement of social 
impact, and the interaction between the three. 
The second set of factors includes a range of cost calculations.  Taking the 
conventional accounting range, the following are relevant basis of cost allocated 
against relevant income for different decision types: 
 direct cost incurred at the point of delivery 
 total direct cost incurred 
 contribution costing – that is the incremental cost from a decision being taken 
 partial absorption of overheads – as in many public sector local authority and 
central government systems 
 full absorption of overheads (and different bases of allocation within each of 
these last two). 
Determining which costing basis should apply must be derived from: 
 an understanding of the decisions for which this analysis is to form the basis 
 an understanding of how materially accurate the outputs and hence the inputs to 
that equation need to be  
 an understanding of the inherent information asymmetry within most multi-party 
or multi-agency situations: the information on which one party decides will be 
different (by selecting different data, by analysing it differently and by 
interpreting or using it differently) from that on which another does 
 an understanding of what is therefore relevant and what is not… 
 ...and over what range of outputs that data is relevant: typically different data 
sets are needed for different decisions, which may be as simple as the size of 
grant fund to be administered, or the size and frequency of individual grants to 
be made from it 
 an understanding of how easily the input data can be gathered, and how it can 
be tested for validity, and 
 how risk and risk management affect the whole decision tree. 
This is a regular pattern of data support for decision-making experienced across non-
profits, and to a large extent the commercial arena as well.  
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2.6. Conclusion: lessons for Outsourcing Grantmaking at BIG 
There is a rich and well developed literature on outsourcing from which to draw. In 
our interviews with staff in BIG many spoke implicitly of many of the issues which are 
raised in the literature, including: 
 core competences of BIG 
 expedient and strategic reasons for outsourcing 
 challenges to measuring transaction costs and full cost accounting 
 the importance of tight contracts, including trust deeds in the case of trusts 
 and issues of imperfect information, for instance around how monitoring and 
compliance regimes are structured. 
The outsourcing literature helps to provide a useful strategic and conceptual 
framework for the study.  
Outsourcing of grant making by the BIG Lottery involves some important differences 
with the mainstream literature. Nonetheless, both the cost and strategy type 
approaches provide some lessons, albeit with greater acceptance that outcomes are 
not measured in financial terms (or necessarily quantitatively).  
There are some lessons from the literature about widening the scope of decision 
making beyond cost and value/outcome factors. This might include considerations of 
strategy, core competence, market position and risks (e.g. the risk of establishing a 
pool of rival grant makers), issues of time (outsourcing decisions may have 
implications for up to ten years, and even longer in the future with the possibility to 
establish trusts in perpetuity) and of (organisational) learning (namely that decision 
should improve through doing and drawing on experience). 
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3. Approaches to Outsourcing 
3.1. Introduction 
This section presents the research findings on each of the outsourced models 
considered. It outlines the range of approaches BIG has used to each model, and 
considers a combination of commons factors (around relationships, cost and risks) 
together with model-specific issues (for instance the treatment of investment income 
by trusts).  
3.2. Trusts 
Trusts take different forms and play different roles in relation to BIG. The 
following help to illustrate this: 
 Legacy Trust: a time limited Trust with the principal aim of supporting the 
legacy of London 2012. Co-funded by DCMS, Arts Council, BIG and Millennium 
Commission, the trust has a clearly defined programme of supporting legacy 
activities in relation to London 2012 
 Fair Share Trust and Big Local Trust: programmes designed to reach 
disadvantaged communities which had received less Lottery or other funding. 
The programmes combine support for capacity building and community 
engagement with grant making. The Big Local Trust also has greater potential to 
innovate in response to need, for instance through making small loans to 
individuals. Importantly, the trusts may become and act as partners of BIG in the 
future 
 JESSICA (Scotland): designed to complement the European Regional 
Development Fund of the same name, JESSICA Scotland is intended to provide 
a range of funding support in disadvantaged communities, and notably through 
economic interventions that may be outside the remit of BIG's mainstream 
programmes 
 Forces in Mind Trust: this Trust is intended to help build strategic infrastructure 
in the support provided to ex-service people and their families. FiMT is intended 
to be a strategic policy actor which helps to bring together a disparate sector of 
organisations, as well as making grants in what are identified to be key areas.  
In each of the above, a rationale for outsourcing is that the Trust model builds 
expertise and the support mechanisms to target support at a specified social need 
which BIG would find it difficult to achieve through an in-house programme.  
Relationships with Trusts have developed over time. Whilst an independent body is 
established to administer the programme, BIG retains a series of strategic and 
operational relationships. These include ensuring that the Trust continues to fulfil the 
conditions of its Trust Deed (overseen by a Trust Protector), providing assurance to 
BIG around the use of Lottery funding, and as appropriate promoting appropriate 
external communications and public relations. (This is not just about branding, but 
also joint communication and media and influencing work). 
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Interviews with officers in BIG also highlighted issues arising from the independence 
of the Trust. In approving a proposal for Trust delivery, a BIG committee accepts that 
it will establish a separate legal entity that will have its own independent voice.  
However, trusts are not organisations without interests, it is normal for individual 
organisations or consortia to bid to  establish a trust, with the trust either then 
contracting its parent organisation for the delivery of the programme (as in the case 
of Big Local Trust or Fair Share Trust) or establishing new delivery arrangements in-
house. Nonetheless, the independent status of a trust means that BIG has to 
develop a different set of relationships with a trust than it does for instance with an 
award partner. This was found to be a challenge both to BIG and trusts. 
Interviewees felt that trusts could be effective at building capacity in their sector. 
The Year 1 evaluation report of the Building Change Trust in Northern Ireland 
highlights: 
The establishment of the Trust has helped to increase capacity by drawing 
together a consortium of like-minded individuals who will collectively have a 
positive influence within the C&V sector. The extent of this influence will be 
increasingly evident upon further implementation and roll-out of interventions.17  
This was reflected in further comments that the trust had raised awareness with 
interest from the third sector greater than anticipated.  
It was also noted in the interim evaluation of the Building Change Trust that the 
programme had enabled innovation in the support of the third sector. Examples 
included work to develop social capital in two pilot communities and in partnership 
with Charity Bank the development of a loan fund for the sector. These approaches 
were concerned respectively with community resilience (through social capital) and 
sustainability (through considering new funding models). 
There were differing views about the appropriate level of monitoring information 
trusts should provide BIG: on the one hand Trusts are required to monitor activities 
to fulfil the terms of the trust deed, but on the other BIG may require information on 
what is being funded.  Monitoring and relationship issues were often framed around 
how far relationships should be transactional and how far they are a strategic or an 
operational relationship. BIG's understanding and approach to these issues appears 
to have evolved over time. In particular, there is a greater focus on relationships 
being both strategic and operational and in being subject to engagement by senior 
policy staff and customer relationship management practices with a dedicated 
contact points within BIG. Some felt this could go further with relationships focusing 
more on strategic issues in the future. Such a shift would reflect the independent 
nature of trusts. 
Perceived risks relating to trusts arose from the lack of control BIG could exercise 
because of the absence of a contractual relationship. Trusts also contain potential 
audit and reputational risks to BIG. In comparison with award partners and 
portfolios these risks were not seen to be great, primarily because safeguards had 
been put in place through extensive audit and due diligence prior to the 
establishment of the trust. As BIG's internal guidance on trusts notes: A trust is 
independently regulated by trust, charity and company law. This is arguably a 
tougher set of controls than for direct grants. A review of trust governance 
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arrangements undertaken for BIG18 found appropriate systems to be in place, noting 
moderate level of risks in relation to: 
 risk assessments not being presented to Committees to help inform decisions 
 no verification of Development grant expenditure 
 inappropriate set-up of BIG's grant management system Merlin by trusts. 
Good practice in trust set-up includes: joint procurement exercises in Scotland 
helping to save costs; effective selection of protectors, and clear and comprehensive 
guidance materials. 
BIG had delivered, and was planning to deliver, a wide range of programmes through 
trusts. Although trusts were seen as a vehicle to allow for experimentation in grant 
making and in areas such as social finance and social investment, they also required 
a coherent programme design combined with a delivery partner or partners 
capable of realising the goals of the programme. This was held to be a strength of 
trusts such as Building Change and the Legacy Trust. However, some concerns 
were raised around the Life Changes Trust, originally intended as a programme to 
support young care leavers in Scotland, but which now also includes support to 
dementia sufferers and their carers, following support from the Scottish Government 
to focus on this additional area. Whilst the focus of the programme is on care and 
carers, the two groups are very different. Finding a single organisation to set up a 
trust and meet the two needs of the two target groups has been difficult.   
There were differing viewpoints on the extent to which programmes needed to be 
fully defined before the trust is established. In the case of the Legacy Trust, a 
strength of the trust was seen to be that the trust deed and work programme were 
very clear at the outset and enabled the trust to have a strong focus on delivery. 
Conversely, in the case Fair Share Trust or Big Local Trust, there was a view that 
that trustees (often from the original sponsoring organisation(s)) needed flexibility as 
the rationale of the programmes was to support community capacity building and the 
bottom-up development of projects.  
As discussed elsewhere, the administration costs of trusts were seen as high by 
some within BIG. However, our findings suggest that there is considerable variation 
in the delivery or operational costs of trusts. Key issues here were around the extent 
to which capacity building support was seen as an operational cost and the extent to 
which new systems needed to be established. More complex programmes such as 
Big Local Trust had higher costs. Conversely the costs of the Legacy Trust were 
relatively low.  
Considerations of financial expediency might encourage BIG to choose a Trust as a 
delivery model, because the approach enables BIG to plan for and release large 
blocks of funding. 
A unique feature of Trusts in comparison to Award Partners and Portfolios is the 
treatment of investment income. Either with one off or staged endowments, Trusts 
are in a position to invest the fund. During the 2000s, the Fair Share Trust was able 
to receive an additional income of over £10 million from an initial investment of £50 
million. Following the financial crisis, this level of return now seems high but it does 
remain an opportunity for trusts in the future. Investment income is normally required 
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to be reinvested for the purposes of the trusts, and therefore increases programme 
expenditure.  
Other unique features of trusts are that they have a trust deed and a trust protector. 
In the case of the former these tend to be, out of necessity, complex and technical 
documents. There was a need, as one interviewee suggested, 'for these to be 
translated into plain English in a delivery plan'.  
BIG has to date used trusts in a range of ways. However, some aspects of trusts 
remain untested. A notable area here is trusts being established for a longer term 
(over 20 years) or even in perpetuity, whereby they would be able to raise funds 
independently. Indeed some may become a partner to BIG in the future delivery of 
programmes. 
Trusts can take time to develop before they are in a position to disburse grants. Both 
the Big Local Trust and Building Change Trust took over two and a half years to 
develop. Once established they help BIG to release large sums of funding, but they 
are not a means to do this quickly. 
3.3. Award Partners 
Award Partners can take different forms and play different roles in relation to BIG 
although to a lesser extent than Trusts. The following help to illustrate this: 
 Changing Spaces supported five award partners: Natural England (Access to 
Nature), Groundwork (Community Spaces), BRE (Community Sustainable 
Energy), Mind (Ecominds) and RSWT (Local Food) 
 Big Deal was a £4million19 award partner programme funded under the Young 
People’s Fund programme which launched in Northern Ireland in 2005. The Big 
Deal programme was delivered through a partnership, with the Voluntary Youth 
Network for Northern Ireland, operating as Youthnet, as the lead organisation.  
We have also considered several programmes which did not develop as originally 
planned. 
 with Growing Community Assets, BIG brought assessment back in-house in the 
latter years of the contract in order to support better decision-making by BIG, 
although a consortium of agencies continued to provide support throughout. 
Although it was not developed as an Award Partner programme, not least 
because BIG never delegated decision-making, its hybrid approach makes it 
most comparable with Award Partner programmes 
 Research Grants was brought back in-house in its entirety 
 Space and Place was originally intended to be a portfolio programme but is now 
being delivered by an Award Partner. This is because delays to local 
government re-organisation in Northern Ireland risked undermining BIG’s desire 
to involve communities in planning and managing projects. 
In each of the Award Partners, a rationale for outsourcing is that the Award Partner 
is primarily bringing expertise (including infrastructure and capacity) to achieve 
something more effectively than BIG.  
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Relationships with Award Partners are more clearly defined than in trusts. Award 
Partners are acting under contract to BIG for the delivery of all or part of a 
programme. Whilst the programmes considered highlighted that contract compliance 
issues of cost control and monitoring were largely managed satisfactorily, softer 
factors such as relationship management could be overlooked, notably in the arena 
of branding. As the Lessons Learned paper for BIG Deal highlights:  
Effective relationship management was key and required increased staff 
resources over the grant period. For example, the Head of Communications and 
other communications staff needed to invest additional resources and time to 
ensure that the Communications and Branding Protocol – that the Award 
Partner had signed up to – was being delivered effectively. 
Compared with trusts, there was far greater involvement by BIG in the different 
stages of the programme cycle. Organisations were required to have grant 
management systems (application and monitoring) consistent with those of BIG. This 
was probably the single area which had caused greatest concern for BIG. Many 
award partners were found to have had long-standing relationships with BIG which 
covered a number of programmes. Many interviewees noted that this helped 
considerably with the 'steep learning curve' required to implement each new 
programme. New monitoring systems, for instance requiring monthly performance 
monitoring to BIG, were seen as problematic by some Award Partners. Conversely, 
BIG saw benefits in more consistent and transparent approaches to performance 
management – not least in identifying potential problems.  
Where Award Partner relationships cover successive programmes concerns were 
raised (by BIG and the Award Partner) of the challenges of transition, to meet new 
modes of working by BIG (such as grant assessment) but also new programme 
objectives. The main example of this was seen in the Growing Community Assets 
(GCA) programme in Scotland which followed the Scottish Land Fund (SLF). The 
changing focus of the programme to include urban areas and changing performance 
requirements presented problems. A lesson here is that whilst there is a need for 
negotiation between BIG and the partner, programmes need to be fully specified at 
contract sign off stage. A further point is that the Award Partner may not have the 
expertise to deliver the new programme. 
Where partnership relationships cover successive programmes both BIG and 
partners highlighted the challenges of transition, to meet new modes of working by 
BIG (such as grant assessment) but also new programme objectives. The main 
example of this was seen in the Growing Community Assets (GCA) programme in 
Scotland which followed the Scottish Land Fund (SLF). The changing focus of the 
programme to include urban areas and changing performance requirements 
presented problems. This underlines the importance for BIG of fully re-specifying its 
requirements rather than simply relying on negotiation with an existing partner. 
Award Partners in many cases combined support and development with grant 
management.  This raises a series of issues both around the structuring of 
application processes and the extent of separation between support and assessment. 
On the former, award partners had used both one and two stage application 
processes, with programme marketing being conducted through well-established 
channels. This provided additional reach (for BIG) and allowed the Award Partner to 
target support for applicants. However, this was found to be with mixed success 
especially where the Award Partner had most but not all the requisite skills to provide 
support. On the second issue Award Partners which are smaller organisations may 
lack the capacity to have a clear separation between support and development and 
project appraisal. Award partners, as suppliers of services on BIG's behalf, need to 
meet BIG's requirements. This was found to be a problem in a small set of 
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programmes where the pressures of managing a complex programme, requiring 
support and appraisal aspects, meant grant assessment was sometimes delayed 
and inconsistent feedback provided to applicants. These issues can largely be 
resolved through tighter specification of programmes and client relationship 
management. 
BIG was found to have moved towards a model of customer relationship 
management for Award Partners which combined attention to risk, performance and 
relationship management. The change in approach from BIG meant that Award 
Partners were managed less as individual grants but more as high value/low volume 
contracts which required more dedicated support from a CRM team. The setting up 
of Award Partners was also found to need to go beyond narrow issues of contract 
compliance to do with cost control, audit and monitoring and to include issues of 
branding. The following is taken from the FDF Stage 2 paper for Space and Place: 
Due to the specific nature of the programme it will be important to develop a 
robust communications and branding protocol for the Award Partner that sets 
out at an early stage BIG’s expectations in relation to recognition of funding and 
the importance of separating our funded projects from the Award Partner’s 
substantive work.  The protocol must also explain clearly that branding is wider 
than just the use of a logo. (FDF Stage 2 Paper for Space and Place, October 
2010.)  
This reflects learning from programmes such as BIG Deal. 
As with Trusts and Portfolios, programme governance has allowed for more wide 
ranging partnerships to form than might otherwise have been the case. As the 
evaluation of Big Deal highlights: 
A Children and Young People’s Forum (CYPF) was set up by the award partner 
to put young people at the forefront of the programme management. The 
evaluation shows that through appropriate sub-structures, regional participation 
can be accessible to all young people. The CYPF has impacted positively by 
building capacity which equips young people to make informed and mature local 
decisions. It has also provided a skills base and platform for them to engage in 
other structures, whether these are other youth service providers, or 
participative structures such as local Youth Councils (Lessons Learned paper, 
2012). 
This governance extended to a small grants programme where it was found that: 
Over the period September 2006 to September 2010, 128 young people aged 
between seven and 25 participated in 80 panel meetings and made decisions on 
1140 applications resulting in 723 awards. (Lessons Learned paper, 2012). 
As discussed elsewhere, the administration costs of Award Partners varied 
considerably – one respondent highlighted that operational costs can be four to five 
times higher than in-house BIG programmes. We found operational costs accounting 
for between eight and 22 per cent of programme expenditure. Organisations with 
limited Award Partner experience were found to have higher costs. Moreover, costs 
also varied depending on the level of support and development activities provided 
within the programme. In making additional awards to Award Partners, BIG found 
that it was able to reduce operational costs quite significantly, partly through 
providing clear signals to Award Partners as to reasonable cost levels. Nonetheless, 
there remains cost variation and this is largely due to the additional activities required 
to deliver the grants, and the experience and scale of the award partner. It was also 
perceived that renegotiated contracts had come with cuts to some operational 
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activities (such as marketing) but it was too soon to judge the effect of this on project 
quality.  
Lessons have been drawn from the Research Programme and implemented by BIG 
in subsequent programmes. The following table indicates areas which are important 
to successful outsourcing of programmes. 
BIG reviewed and drew lessons from Research Grants and has implemented 
improved procedures in subsequent programmes. An independent review of 
Research Grants had highlighted the following areas as important to successful 
outsourced delivery: 
 robust risk assessment and cost benefit analysis (included appropriate 
sensitivity analysis) at the beginning of procurement 
 a robust procurement approach that allows reconsideration of decisions to 
outsource if no suitable bids are received, as well as due diligence checks and 
site visits 
 a full and final specification of the programme and service required before 
procurement begins 
 use of Prince2 standards of project management to ensure timely delivery of the 
project 
 use of formal interim reporting and compliance checks (rather than simply 
minuted discussion) in contract management, as well as proper training in 
contract management for BIG staff with the responsibility 
 clear definition of roles and responsibilities for governance, programme 
management and contract management, as well as procedures for escalating 
concerns and managing crises. 
 
3.4. Portfolios 
BIG has developed a range of portfolio models. The following three examples  
help to illustrate this: 
 Changing Spaces (Portfolio) (England) was a programme of five portfolios led 
by Catch 22 (Community Space Challenge), Imperial College (Open Air 
Laboratories Network, OPAL), Field Studies Council (Eco Challenge), Places for 
People (Green Spaces for People) and Plunkett Foundation (Making Local Food 
Work) 
 Children's Play (England) in which portfolios were defined at a local authority 
level with the former local Children’s Play Strategies being used to priorities 
projects) 
 Wellbeing Portfolio (England) consisted of ten regional and seven England-
wide portfolios. Key strands of the programme were mental health, tackling 
obesity, physical activity and healthy eating and 2012 Olympics 
 International Strategic Programme (UK-Wide) whereby BIG had awarded six 
portfolios, each led by a UK based NGO which co-ordinates a programme of 
development overseas.  
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This range reflects the flexibility in the portfolio model which allows BIG to retain 
much control over grant management whilst engaging organisations which provide 
reach and specialist expertise.   
The basic model for portfolios is for BIG to engage organisations which in turn 
develop a group or portfolio of projects. These portfolios might be at a specific 
geographical level (such as Children's Play which was with lower tier local authorities 
in England or Wellbeing with regional portfolios) or by specialism (as in Changing 
Spaces).  
Portfolio programmes are typically let through a two stage application process 
(such as with Changing Spaces) although this is not required where funding is 
allocated geographically (such as in Children's Play).The two stage process allows 
BIG to shape projects from stage 1 to stage 2 but also to provide development grant 
funding to applicants to help form the full portfolio of projects.  
Throughout our interviews with BIG staff it was correctly noted that portfolios do not 
outsource grant decision making: this remains with BIG. Portfolio managers 
likened their role to managing an accountable body and noted that they at times 
lacked the authority of funder. The Plunkett Foundation, lead for the Making Local 
Food Work portfolio of Changes Spaces noted the following: 
We needed to put in reporting structures, etc. for each project.  This had to be 
handled carefully as Plunkett, as accountable body, has to have more authority 
over other partners but also the portfolio must work as a partnership, therefore 
Plunkett can’t be overly strong.  At times, this has proven a bit tricky as 
‘accountable body’ doesn’t have the same weight as ‘funder.’  However, we 
have good relationships with all partners and there is a healthy respect for 
helping each other when problems arise (Plunkett Foundation Lead Officer) 
Guidance from BIG has been relatively broad, therefore, we’ve been careful in 
our interpretation of their requirements (asking for specific guidance from grant 
officer, Changing Spaces team, evaluation team, press team).  We reference 
the terms & conditions, stage 1/stage 2 guidance notes/emails/letters from BIG.  
All our payments have been on time, we have submitted all of our reports on 
time, we have a strong and open relationship with our grant officer.  For the 
portfolio, the style of BIG has been relatively light-touch. (Plunkett Foundation 
Lead Officer) 
This was supported by a quote from a grant holder in the Wellbeing Programme:  
We have had excellent support from our Grants Officer… I have had experience 
of working with a variety of different funders and this has been by far the most 
positive experience. Wellbeing Programme Lessons Learned Paper. 
Relationships with portfolios varied depending on the complexity of the programme. 
Children's Play for example had a relatively high level of delegation to local 
authorities with a less frequent reporting cycle. Other programmes required more 
active involvement and support from BIG. As the Lessons Learned paper for the 
Wellbeing Portfolio noted:  
The relationship that the grant holder has with their grants officer is pivotal to the 
success of a portfolio programme. This is both in terms of customer satisfaction 
and in added value across directorates. Stability of the grants team is 
particularly important for these types of programmes. Wellbeing Portfolio, 
Lessons Learned Paper 2009. 
 20 
Portfolios, as with other models, were found to involve a high degree of cross-
directorate working within BIG, as the following from the Wellbeing Lessons Learned 
papers illustrate:  
Grants Officers have a great deal of knowledge about portfolios and their 
respective projects, gathered through both day to day contact and monitoring 
reports. All directorates should have access to this information.  
Large Portfolio programmes require a high level of cross directorate working. 
Teams need to work in an integrated way in their daily work, rather than just at 
programme forum level. This should be built in to programme design from the 
outset. 
The level of cross-directorate working was reflected upon in Country interviews, and 
noted that cross-organisation working tended to be simpler in the smaller offices for 
Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland.  
A common finding in Lessons Learned was around the networking opportunities 
afforded by the portfolio approach. This was seen as an integral component of many 
individual portfolios, with some suggesting that funding for this activity should be 
higher. A good example of networking from evaluation reports of the Wellbeing 
Portfolios. Such networking was also seen to lead to possible leveraging of 
additional resources, again which was held to be a feature of the Wellbeing 
Portfolios: 
The programme provides a good example of how BIG funding can leverage 
funding from other sources. This sort of leverage may be particularly important 
as our budgets are affected by the Olympic diversion. Our ability to draw in other 
funding could prove valuable. Further learning from this should be explored. 
The Wellbeing portfolios were seen to help projects work with other projects and also 
work in other areas and access networks more effectively. As one interviewee 
suggested: portfolios provide short cuts for BIG in that they can link projects and 
programmes more effectively as they are more embedded in localities and particular 
policy/practice areas. 
In summary the main advantages from the portfolio model were seen to be that it 
brought in expert organisations with a network of contacts able to build a portfolio of 
projects to build a programme. It also freed up BIG Lottery grant officer time. There 
were also seen to be disadvantages, with some of the development work by 
portfolio leads seen as expensive with considerable and unforeseen support being 
required by BIG to support the lead organisation.  
This issue was also highlighted in the evaluation of Children’s Play: 
Nearly half of local authorities had used BIG funding to secure extra funding for 
play (48%) through a range of sources including government departments and 
local grants. Sustainability was a key issue for play.20 
We did not explore the governance arrangements of individual portfolios in great 
detail, although the following points to potential risks. The evaluation of the 
Community Space Challenge (Changing Spaces Portfolio) found: 
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The Board structure, with the majority of its members involved in operational 
delivery, lacks a degree of independence and may not be ideally suited to 
fulfilling a strategic role. Although a regular meeting forum is useful for 
operational matters the members cannot realistically be expected to give their 
whole energies to the broader, longer term issues at stake (Changing Spaces 
CSC Evaluation, p.44).21 
This issue of independence is a potential risk of the portfolio approach with 
insufficient competition for funds and portfolio governance largely undertaken by 
project leads. Nonetheless, there were some factors which mitigated risks here, 
notably the approval of projects by BIG at the outset, involvement of some external 
representation of portfolio boards and attendance of BIG officers.  
Costs in portfolios were found to range from 10-15 per cent of programme budgets. 
In addition two stage application costs mainly came with development costs. Portfolio 
leads reflected that the costs for programmes such as Wellbeing and Changing 
Spaces were reasonable. Areas where partner organisations believed that they had 
not accurately forecast costs were in legal and monitoring work (with cases of these 
being both under- and over-estimated). From BIG’s perspective the scale and scope 
of monitoring activities meant that quarterly monitoring coupled with compliance 
visits to each project were time-consuming and required considerable preparation. 
Taking into account the hidden costs of portfolios, this approach to outsourcing 
appears more expensive than Trusts or Award Partners, although it does bring 
additional returns, including leveraging of resources, networking and tighter contract 
compliance. 
3.5. Conclusion 
There was considerable variation within approaches, with few programmes or 
approaches being entirely alike. Nonetheless, they did contain common features, 
around the importance of good and tight contracts, well specified programmes and of 
relationship management. The benefits to outsourcing through each model were 
around access to expertise, infrastructure and reach which outsourced partners 
provided. In many cases (Changing Spaces for example), quality of delivery was 
found to be very high. 
As with in-house programmes, good programme development was found to be of 
critical importance. The risks of poorly specified programmes which were outsourced 
were greater and as experience of a small number of programmes showed, resulted 
in considerable unforeseen additional management, legal and audit costs. 
Relationships in the on-going management of outsourced programmes and delivery 
partners were found to matter, and to be valued by partners. Again, well-specified 
programmes with tight contracts which were well communicated were found to be 
important factors, reflected in interviews, evaluations and Lessons Learned papers.  
Each outsourcing model has particular advantages as outlined below: 
 Trusts enable BIG to address a need over the longer term (over five years) 
where such a commitment is required for change, and by being able to deliver 
activities which BIG cannot or would find it difficult to do, including micro grants, 
loans and grants to individuals or community development and capacity-building 
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work that is needed to achieve further outcomes for particular disadvantaged 
groups 
 Award Partners worked well where partner organisations had access to a 
particular group and technical expertise or could provide effective support to 
applicants and grant-holders. Effective award partners have expertise in grant-
making, particularly in governance, supporting capacity and handling appraisal 
and monitoring. It was noted that BIG's requirement for Award Partners to 
comply with its grant making system Merlin had contributed to the level of this 
requirement 
 Portfolios do not involve BIG delegating grant making and management 
powers.  They enable BIG to deliver a broad strategy which includes support 
across policy fields. They were also found to be effective in promoting 
networking and leverage of additional funds. 
All models provided the basis for innovation in some way, although a critical issue 
here was the importance of capturing lessons from this for future programmes and 
wider policy impact.  
All models relied on external expertise existing or being able to be built to deliver the 
programme. Where this is not the case or BIG has concerns in this area, then 
consideration of in-house delivery needs to be made.  
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4. Lessons from Outsourcing  
4.1. Introduction 
A series of cross-cutting findings emerged from the research and are presented here. 
They largely concern process issues.  
4.2. Programme Development: Intelligent Funding and Funding Development 
Framework  
BIG has well established frameworks for the development of programmes. These are 
laid out in its six Intelligent Funding principles and the three stages of its Funding 
Development Framework. Both are highly relevant to the decision to outsource grant 
making. Intelligent Funding places central importance of programmes around 
achieving an outcome change. The Funding Development Framework provides the 
mechanisms for BIG to project manage the design of programmes through to 
programme launch.  
The central consideration in relation to outsourcing in programme development is 
around the following three factors: 
 expertise and knowledge: a third party had the skills, expertise and flexibility to 
deliver a programme more effectively than BIG 
 grant award expertise and capacity is required for both Award Partners and 
Trusts. Although this can be funded through the operating costs of the 
programme, the outsourced partner has to have competence in this area 
 cost: it is cheaper (in terms of BIG's direct costs) to deliver a programme 
through a third party. A common example here was related to reach where 
infrastructure exists to reach the target community, and which for BIG to reach 
through in-house delivery would require the funding of new infrastructure. 
To some extent these factors were reflected in interviews with outsourced partners, 
who were asked what they added to the delivery of BIG programmes. Typical 
interview responses in this regard were 'reach, expertise and capacity' and 'scale 
and expertise and past experience'. 
An award partner stressed that ‘BIG may have been able to fund the same level of 
activity and from that generate the same outcomes on its own, but this would have 
taken them much longer and probably cost quite a bit more, at least in the early 
stages of developing networks and systems’. For this partner, it was noted that their 
approach 'fits with the sector's approach and thinking' and this in turn enabled it to 
bring specific sectoral knowledge to better address wider societal goals.  
Interviews with partner organisations and staff at BIG involved in the Big Boost 
programme highlighted the following as rationales for outsourcing:  
 at the time of programme development, BIG did not have the legal powers to 
make grants to individuals 
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 delivery in-house would have incurred additional costs (notably in additonal 
training for grants officers for what might have been a one-off programme 
 delivery organisations already existed with the requiste expertise 
 delivery organisations had partners which provided sufficient geographic reach. 
However, these central considerations need to be set against the inter-related issues 
of: 
 risk: that BIG potentially loses control of programmes and may not have control 
if programmes fail 
 reputation: that poorly performing programmes damage reputation and the BIG 
brand 
 potential cost and contingency: that the scale BIG has means that it can 
more readily provide for contingencies 
 due diligence and audit: that the outsourcing of programmes comes with 
transaction costs, some of which may be unseen or unknown at the time of 
programme design.  
FDF was seen as a hindrance by some interviewees, and it was suggested that it is 
seen as a set of rules and a rigid framework rather than guidance and common 
principles. Some interviewees also reflected that FDF was only suited for certain 
types programmes and not others. A manager at BIG leading the development of a 
trust noted that 'assessment materials are perhaps not as robust as needed', 
expressing particular concerns about how far the approach was suitable for 
developing programmes in politically sensitive areas, where BIG had to operate in 
partnership with other funding organisations or government bodies, each with its own 
policy commitments in particular areas.  
The Funding Development Framework is currently being redesigned, a process that 
provides some scope to consider how outsourcing decisions are made, notably that 
a fuller assessment of costs and benefits is made, a point which has already been 
put into practice by BIG. 
4.3. Treatment of Cost in Decision Making 
Although the cost of new programmes is currently calculated by activity based 
costing, this has not always been the case; the cost of the majority of the existing 
programmes within the scope of the study will have initially been calculated using 
marginal costing. 
During development, the direct labour resource for the life of the programme would 
have been estimated and the actual direct labour resource used during its lifecycle 
recorded. The costs of the Programme Management Division (PMD) in England are 
considered to be direct labour and are most affected by the programme type chosen. 
PMD’s main activities are: 
 data capture from applications received 
 assessment of applications received 
 short-listing of projects for committee decision 
 contacting successful applicants and arranging the payment of awards 
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 managing the grant (e.g. ensuring successful applicants meet project 
milestones, visiting projects etc) 
 managing disputes 
 end of grant reporting (e.g. assessing how well projects have achieved intended 
outcomes). 
Depending on the programme type chosen, one or more of the activities described 
above will be carried out by the associated organisation, rather than BIG.  
Although PMD’s costs are most significantly affected by programme type, there are 
costs from the other departments that may also vary/be avoided; these are described 
in more detail later on. 
It will be known at an early stage (either before or as part of Stage 1 of the Funding 
Development Framework) if a programme will be launched as one of the different 
outsourced arrangements. There are two main considerations that drive the decision; 
the qualitative consideration of reach and impact (as discussed above) and the 
quantitative consideration of cost and resource. Both of these are in turn driven by 
the overall programme objective. 
Decisions on reach and impact are made by Policy and Regional (outreach and 
development) departments and include the following considerations: 
 does the associated organisation have better capability to contact members of 
the target group and encourage them to apply? 
 can the associated organisation provide higher quality support and development 
than BIG, resulting in better quality applications? 
 is the associate organisation better placed to judge whether applicants are likely 
to meet their project outcomes? 
 can the associated organisation provide specialist support to increase the 
likelihood of the project completing within a set timescale and meeting 
milestones? 
 will fewer disputes arise than if BIG chose to run all aspects of the programme? 
Decisions on cost and resource are made either by the Finance Department, country 
Programme Board or Programme Management Division. The main considerations 
here are: 
 does BIG have the resources/staff available to run the programme? 
 would the cost of BIG running the specific programme under consideration be 
higher than our ideal target of five per cent? 
 would specialist staff/consultants need to be recruited in order for BIG to run the 
programme?  
 would large additional costs outside PMD (e.g. communications helpline, 
regional outreach) be incurred? 
There are also cost considerations of a more corporate nature: 
 is the average operating percentage of BIG’s overall current programme 
portfolio too high? As any costs incurred by the associated organisation are not 
included in BIG’s own accounts therefore running a delegated funding 
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programme can have the effect of lowering BIG's overall operating cost 
percentage 
 has enough of the grant budget been awarded during the year? With a trust 
model, a large award is made relatively quickly. 
The last point reflects the question of expediency. Trusts in particular and to lesser 
extents portfolios and award partners appear to allow BIG greater control over grant 
budget balances and reduce the risk of having high, or greater than forecast, grant 
budget balances on year-end accounts. 
4.4. Organisational Experience of Outsourcing Grantmaking 
BIG is a large and complex organisation in which common practices and procedures 
have developed to help develop and implement programmes. The following points 
were made: 
 BIG now has considerable experience in outsourcing grant making, and far 
more than other grant making bodies to third sector organisations 
 with the track record in outsourcing, staff within BIG have developed a clear 
understanding of success factors in outsourcing, and importantly, much of this 
knowledge has been codified in written guidance, is evident in lessons learned 
reports and various outsourced programmes have been subject to audit and 
evaluation. This track record is also reflected in the understanding of the legal 
requirements of different arrangements and the specific compliance issues for 
each arrangement with respect to Government and to the Lottery Act 
 although programmes vary considerably (in scope and mechanism, size and 
target group) a common reflection in interviews was that there are common 
legal, audit and programme development requirements around each model. 
Nonetheless, there were continuing issues in this area: 
 there were marked differences between the four countries in the operation of 
outsourcing, including issues of approach and experience 
 there was a case history (through audit reports, lessons learned and 
evaluations) of where outsourcing had not been successful (which we reflect on 
further below). Some respondents felt that different decisions should have been 
made about whether to outsource some programmes 
 with varying experiences of outsourcing across the organisation, there were 
differences about which models had been most effective and where BIG should 
place greatest emphasis in the future 
 there was little evidence of perverse outcomes or unintended consequences. 
One example in relation to a trust was the inclusion of a clause to encourage 
spend to be made quickly, something which would have gone against the 
rationale of the trust to take a longer term view based on locally defined needs. 
This clause was subsequently removed. 
4.5. Expediency and Managing Lottery Balances 
Releasing large sums of funding in single or staged payments to partner 
organisations to conduct grant making on behalf of BIG was seen as a key expedient 
reason for outsourcing. As a distributor of National Lottery funding a key objective for 
the organisation is to ensure funding is put to good, and timely, use. Outsourcing, in 
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theory at least, allows BIG to manage this pressure and requirement. The issue is 
compounded as demand for in-house programmes may be lower than expected and 
as Lottery receipts vary year on year.  
Although outsourcing was seen to be a means to reduce cash balances quickly, the 
research found that it was not entirely effective at this, particular for wholly new 
programmes where development times from policy idea to release of funding may 
take up to three years. However, where there is a case for further funding, it was 
found that additional funding could be released to existing partners (notably Award 
Partners and Portfolios, but conceivably Trusts) at shorter notice. Nonetheless, a key 
driver of outsourcing was found to be the managed disbursement of substantial 
tranches of funding.  
4.6. Relationships, branding and partnership 
In the consideration of each approach to outsourcing a common theme to emerge 
was around the management of relationships. Interviewees reflected on the nature of 
the relationship with partners, how these should be managed and cost implications. 
They were seen to have been neglected in some earlier programmes with the result 
that BIG had at times lost some control of programmes or had insufficient information. 
As highlighted in the lessons from the Research Programme, relationship 
management was also seen to involve harder skills around negotiation and enforcing 
contract compliance. The establishment of the customer relationship management 
team in BIG responded to these concerns and is appropriate to high value/low 
volume programmes. A number of partner organisations reflected that BIG's due 
diligence and monitoring processes are ‘too bureaucratic’. 
However, the benefits of more active contract relationship management were also 
noted. For the BIG Boost it was noted that that risk 'was always in the scenario. 
Everyone understood that the programme was risky – not just for Big Lottery but also 
for partners'. With respect to this the partner organisation highlighted that BIG 
managed steering group meetings and led monitoring reviews: 'having consistency 
was important, and regular meetings with a good contract manager at helped the 
programme to run smoothly'. 
The Fair Share Trust noted that its relationship with BIG took three main forms: 
 a monitoring relationship with BIG's CRM team 
 a strategic relationship with BIG at chief executive level and through the role of 
the protector 
 a day-to-day relationship responding to requirements around media coverage, 
politicians' requests and BIG's regional teams for local case examples. 
Moreover it was noted that relationships had changed, evolved and improved. The 
final point was echoed by other partner interviewees who highlighted the benefits of 
the CRM approach to managing relationships. 
There were differing views on BIG's role vis-à-vis partner organisations. The 
following highlight this tension: 
 in one programme there was a perception that BIG had done a lot of 
handholding of the partner organisation with assistance on the risk strategy and 
equalities strategy 
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 conversely, a partner organisation highlighted that what BLF do well is find good 
partners and then push out the funding […] [we] have the grassroots 
connections through to local organisations that they would not have otherwise. 
One programme manager in BIG also noted the importance of the development 
phase of the programme: 'there had been definite challenges particularly culturally 
but over six months (the development phase) have developed a better understanding 
- about organisations getting to know each other and getting better aligned.' 
Public relations and more general branding issues were raised in interviews with staff 
in BIG and some of the partner organisations. Lessons appear to have been drawn 
from previous programmes where BIG had to 'retrofit' communications strategies into 
partner organisations. From BIG's perspective communications are a key part of its 
wider mission as a learning organisation. However, partner organisations did note 
that communications activities did come with additional costs which needed to be 
factored in: 'communications are more than just adding the logo'. In some 
programmes BIG had helped organisations to develop communications toolkits and 
worked with organisations to ensure an appropriate communications strategy was 
developed. This was seen as both helping the programme and the organisation 
concerned.  
Outsourcing was also seen as a way to gain access to other brands and therefore to 
increase the overall brand value (and thus the reach) of the programme. An example 
was given of the Wellbeing portfolios in this regard and the hosting of a portfolio by 
an NHS Trust: this helped raise profile, helps projects to have an identifiable 
name … and aids referrals to the projects. 
A final set of considerations is around the strategic relationship between BIG and its 
outsourced partners. Many of the outsourced programmes go beyond simple 
principal-agent contract relationships. BIG is working jointly with organisations to 
develop programmes which have considerable profiles and brands in their own right. 
We did not consider this issue extensively through staff interviews, although it was 
evident that programmes were informed through consultation and which involved 
chief officers from other organisations. As other research for BIG has reflected, 
programmes are not developed in isolation or in a vacuum.22  
These issues could more broadly be seen to describe the policy and grant making 
'field' or 'landscape’ within which BIG operates. These issues were also found to vary 
between the countries, and it was noted that the smaller size of policy making 
communities in Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales, compared to England, 
sometimes made it easier to formulate programmes and delivery mechanisms. 
Conversely it was noted that one portfolio lead 'obviously had a lot of high level 
contacts and many informal networks that don't need the formality that BIG require in 
the application'.  
Other examples of responding to the policy field or environment include:  
 Legacy Trust which was required to fund the UK School Games 
 Realising Ambition portfolio in which Catch 22 ‘has vast experience in this area 
[the programme is targeted at preventing and reducing youth offending by 8-18 
year olds] and is exactly the kind of thing that we  should be involved in. [They] 
                                               
22
 Ellis Paine, A., Taylor, R., and Alcock, P. (2012) Wherever there is money there is influence: exploring BIG’s 
impact on the third sector. Birmingham: Third Sector Research Centre. Report available at: 
http://www.tsrc.ac.uk/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=lNwTr4ZElmg%3d&tabid=500  
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run various Government initiatives and also BIG programmes before including 
the National Citizens Service partnership’. 
 Live UnLtd is part funded by Big Lottery and UnLtd 'has developed a real 
specialism around supporting young entrepreneurs - team and resources have 
grown'. 
These are examples of outsourced organisations providing reach and expertise, but 
also how BIG's relationship is beyond a contractual one for programme delivery.  
Moreover, partner organisations have their own interests in securing contracts to 
deliver outsourced programmes on behalf of BIG: these may be to do with a 
contribution to their central mission, to strengthen own role within a particular policy 
field, or financial in terms of the resources programme management can bring. All of 
these are legitimate factors which BIG need to respond to.  
A final consideration is around the 'field' within which programmes may operate. 
Outsourced partner organisations needed legitimacy amongst peer and front-line 
organisations to act. An example given here was the Growing Community Assets 
programme where it was argued that the Award Partner lacked legitimacy amongst 
some frontline organisations targeted by the programme. This raises concerns for 
BIG, and reflects conditions where there may be neither a clear lead organisation nor 
sufficient competition, but rather a contested policy field. This is common in many 
areas of the voluntary and community sector. Again, this is not a reason not to 
outsource, except for extreme conditions, but is a consideration BIG needs to 
respond to.  
4.7. Structure of Delivery Arrangements 
The structure of outsourced partner delivery arrangements are central to the reach 
they provided BIG in programme delivery. There were various examples of this: 
 Fair Share Trust reported that the Community Foundation Network (CFN) (its 
sole trustee and delivery partner) has a delegated model of local affiliated trusts. 
It is through this network of agents that CFN deliver programme activities of 
capacity building and local-level grant making 
 the Royal Society for Wildlife Trusts (an Award Partner on the Changing Spaces 
programme) highlighted that its Community members took on the role of 
publicising the programme amongst their members, which meant that marketing 
efforts on the part of [the AP] only needed to be small scale.  
These benefits were well understood and were welcome. However, concerns were 
raised in these and other programmes, notably around: 
 lack of programme skills particularly around meeting BIG's monitoring and 
financial requirements. This often required additional support from BIG to ensure 
these were robust. It was noted that lessons have been learned from BIG's 
experience on earlier outsourced programmes 
 organisations may have excellent connections to member or affiliate 
organisations but these may not necessarily be evenly spread, with this then 
reflected in the geographic distribution of applications 
 wider policy change can affect delivery, with an example of this being the 
Wellbeing portfolio and health service change, where PCTs in England formerly 
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had a responsibility for monitoring subcontractors, but with health service reform 
which abolished the PCTs, new arrangements had to be put in place. 
4.8. Wider Policy Impacts  
One rationale for outsourcing is to have a wider impact on the policy environment. 
This applies equally to trusts, award partners and portfolios. The Lessons Learned 
paper for the BIG Deal found that this had been achieved to some extent, through for 
example: 
 demonstrating the way in which young people could be involved in decision 
making and through this influencing wider policy arenas (for instance Education 
and Library Board structures) 
 guidance for Youth Councils being prepared in conjunction with development 
workers and the policy worker 
 development of a model of youth involvement in a small grants programme 
which could be replicated.  
The same report also highlighted the importance of leadership in programme 
management as an important factor in sustaining these benefits and in terms of 
increasing impact on other organisations.  
These issues were reflected on in case study interviews, with a tension between 
short term delivery of specified programmes and ensuring that learning from 
programmes informs both future programmes and wider policy. To some extent this 
depends on the mission and capacity of the partner organisation, and how it may use 
delivery of a BIG programme to gain an advantage within its own field (the point 
made under relationships, branding and partnership, above). 
4.9. Reach, Outcomes and Impact 
This section explores the available evidence on the reach, outcomes and impact of 
outsourced programmes. It draws primarily on evaluation evidence. Critically we 
seek to find inferences between the delivery model (outsourced arrangement) and 
reach and outcomes. This is a weak but possibly the only available 'counter-factual' 
at present. In conclusion, the section outlines how this might be addressed in the 
future.  
Trusts 
Many trusts are relatively new and have not yet reported evaluation findings 
regarding outcomes and impact, or have only reported evaluation findings with 
respect to the process of setting the Trust up and the early stages of delivery. 
However, of the evaluations that have been published a number of lessons can be 
identified. 
a) There can be strategic benefits to partners coming together during the design 
and delivery of a Trust. The partners develop a better understanding of each 
other's work and can begin to engage with and influence wider policy agendas 
more effectively 
b) The Trust model enables alternative, flexible and sometimes innovative 
approaches to grant making that would not be possible through traditional, more 
rigid open programmes that BIG usually delivers 
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c) The outcomes and impacts of Trusts are likely to be realised over a longer time 
frame than traditional funding programmes. This is due to the longer lead-in and 
development period associated with Trusts, but also because Trusts enable 
funding to be distributed over a longer period. 
Award Partners 
Most Award Partners have commissioned their own evaluations of the programmes 
they have delivered. These evaluations typically identify a range of positive 
outcomes associated with activities delivered through the programmes. However, 
there is rarely any discussion of how these outcomes differ from or are added to 
those that could have been achieved by BIG delivering the programme in-house, or 
the extent to which they are different or additional to the Award Partner’s other (non-
BIG funded) activities. This is not to say that these programmes are not achieving 
outcomes and impacts more effectively than an in-house approach, but that the 
evaluations were not set up to test the merits of the outsourcing approach, so little 
evidence has been generated. 
Portfolios 
Similar to Award Partners most Portfolios have been externally evaluated and some 
strong evidence about outcomes and impact has been collected. In at least three of 
the Portfolios considered in this study a common approach to monitoring and 
evaluation data collection (e.g. a framework of standard measures and questions) 
was developed and applied at project level. This enabled a more robust analysis of 
programme wide outcomes and impact than, for example, where Trusts and Award 
Partners developed and commissioned their own evaluations. It is likely that the 
Portfolio development process, which requires organisations to develop a series 
complementary projects around a core theme (such as well-being), was a factor in 
the emergence of these common evaluation approaches. 
Despite the number of high quality Portfolio evaluations, similar to other evaluations 
of outsourced programmes they did not overtly consider the issue of whether the 
outsourced grantmaking approach effect the nature or volume of outcomes achieved. 
Conclusion 
The evaluation evidence demonstrates that outsourced grant programmes do lead to 
outcomes and impacts for the people and communities they are intended to benefit. 
What is less clear is the extent to which these benefits would have been possible if 
the programme had been delivered in-house by BIG. The evaluations have not been 
set up to address this (counter-factual) question. However, it is evident from 
programmes such as the Fair Share Trust that if the programme had not been 
outsourced, then a large cohort of community development workers would have had 
to be recruited by BIG.  
There is some evidence that the process of setting up and developing a Trust can 
build capacity and realise strategic benefits for the organisations involved with the 
Corporate Trustee. There is also emerging evidence that Trusts enable more flexible 
and innovative grantmaking that when compared to traditional approaches. The 
evidence around Award Partners and Portfolios is less clear and more (quasi) 
experimental evaluation approaches would be needed to gain a proper 
understanding of whether and how outsourced grantmaking can lead to greater 
outcomes, impact and reach when compared to BIG's in-house approaches. 
 32 
4.10. Innovation, Learning and Evaluation responsibilities 
A rationale for using outsourcing is that it enables BIG to innovate and therefore to 
more effectively improve the outcomes for those most in need. Many programmes 
were held up as examples of how outsourcing had enabled it to do things which it 
could not have otherwise have done, including: 
 Fair Share Trust which enabled BIG to target resources at the most 
disadvantaged neighbourhoods 
 Big Local Trust which built on the experience of Fair Share Trust and enabled 
the development of an approach to grant making which was community led 
 Big Boost which trialled the award of small grants to young people with 
additional funding if business ideas showed promise of becoming viable 
businesses 
 Forces in Mind Trust which will establish new and independent capacity in the 
third sector serving ex-service people and their families. 
However some questioned the extent to which the programmes were innovative and 
whether some could have been delivered in-house. As one respondent noted, in this 
area it requires outsourced organisations to generate innovative ideas: 'what 
happens if they don't?'. This point highlighted the importance for understanding the 
policy field with which BIG and outsourced partners operate: it cannot always be 
assumed that innovation will occur. This may be for a variety of reasons including the 
capacity of partner organisations and their resources. In these cases BIG may need 
to look at other ways of building capacity or delivering programmes.  
Alongside innovation, BIG is actively committed to learning from its programmes. 
However, it was noted that outsourcing may hinder this endeavour unless attention is 
given to contracts and relationship building at the start of the programme. As one 
respondent suggested: 
'BIG Lottery needs to maximise and retain learning in order assess impact of its 
work … but in order to maximise learning [we] probably need to retain some 
control … perhaps Trusts don't enable BIG to do this so well'. 
For Award Partners and Portfolios, overall responsibility for evaluation remained 
with BIG although individual Portfolios and Award Partners have commissioned their 
own evaluations, often as part of an agreement with BIG. This has raised some 
coordination issues, as the Lessons Learned paper for the Wellbeing Portfolio 
highlights: 
For large portfolio programmes, evaluations should be designed when the 
programme is developed. This allows grant holders to consider the national BIG 
evaluation alongside their individual project evaluations. This also minimises 
duplication of evaluation activities where grant holders undertake their own 
evaluations and provides better customer service.  
It was not within the scope of this research study to explore the effectiveness of 
evaluation arrangements.  However, there are some potential risks around 
duplication or poor coordination (as in the Wellbeing Portfolio), the setting of 
evaluation terms of reference by the partner in isolation from BIG, evaluators 
contracted by and reporting to the partner, and a more general concern that partners 
are likely to lack the evaluation and learning capacity of BIG. All of these are 
constraining factors. 
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The delegation of evaluation responsibilities, whilst useful in developing learning 
cultures in partner organisations (especially for process evaluations) does run the 
risk that separate and local evaluation designs do not allow for aggregation back to 
the programme level. This risk is particularly prevalent for impact evaluations.  
Evaluation responsibilities for Trusts have rested both with BIG and the individual 
trust. Many of the same considerations apply.  
The following example shows how evaluation, innovation and learning are intended 
to come together in the recently launched Realising Ambition programme.  
Realising Ambition Programme: How does the Outsourced Model Contribute to 
Learning? 
Realising Ambition is funding a portfolio of projects led by Catch-22. The portfolio is intended 
to build on national and international evidence - the main comparator programme being the 
Blue Print programme in the United States. Similar programmes have been run in Canada, 
Mexico and other European countries. At the heart of the portfolio is learning from whether 
similar approaches could work in the United Kingdom. 
The emphasis of the programme is on evidence and what works - and it includes an online 
outcomes framework, extensive qualitative research, tools such as SROI and it has also 
funded four randomised control trials.   
Catch 22 and its delivery partners are working to help build capacity in frontline organisations 
around monitoring and evaluation. The portfolio approach to the programmes was seen as a 
means to greatly enhance the building of a critical mass of evidence.  
BIG recognised that it would not be able to deliver this programme alone, with the portfolio 
approach enabling it maximise the potential for innovation and provide the evidence base for 
scaling up the projects in the future.  
 
Finally, as highlighted elsewhere evidence was found of learning programmes which 
presented unexpected challenges. For the Research Programme, lessons from 
delivery were that the award partner needed both an understanding of the field and 
of the operating environment (how research grants should be made and by who) and 
competence (expertise). A lesson from these programmes was that unforeseen 
challenges can be expensive to rectify in terms of additional staff time and external 
fees.  
4.11. Preparing for the Future 
There were competing views on how grant making may develop in the future. One 
view was that BIG needed to become both more responsive to need, and emerging 
needs, but also seek to act much more as an innovator in grant making. In this latter 
mode it may be involved more readily in outsourcing where it provides the funding for 
programmes to be designed and delivered which are more responsive and can be 
more flexible in light of emerging circumstances. An example given in this area was 
around the emergent agenda of social investment, and the role BIG should play both 
in funding social investment but also in shaping the social investment agenda.  
4.12. Conclusion 
This section has considered issues to emerge from interviews and the documentary 
review which cuts across individual approaches to outsourcing. Four features came 
across strongly: 
 34 
 BIG has sophisticated approaches for the development of programmes 
which largely, but not entirely, apply to all forms of outsourced programme. 
Exceptions include the development of more experimental programmes that are 
required to evolve during delivery. BIG's approaches to programme 
development, primarily Intelligent Funding principles and Funding Development 
Framework stages provide a guide for good programme development. BIG also 
had considerable expertise in the main functions required for outsourcing, 
namely legal, audit, customer relationship management, programme 
development, accounting and communications. These were frequently more 
advanced than those of the partner organisations it contracted with 
 BIG's approach to outsourcing has evolved and lessons have been 
learned. However, as outlined in the previous section, good programme 
development was the key to subsequent relationship management issues 
 a neglected issue is around understanding outsourcing is BIG's position in 
relation to wider policy fields and the importance of the alignment of BIG's 
policy objectives with those of its partners, and vice versa. . Partner 
organisations had their own strategies, motivations and objectives which may 
include the use of outsourcing to promote a particular issue, gain competitive 
advantage and market position, and secure resources 
 outsourcing provides BIG with a mechanism to manage its Lottery 
Funding balances – particularly through scheduling large programme 
payments to partners, although it does not necessarily provide a means to 
release funding quickly. 
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5. Costs of Outsourcing 
5.1. Introduction 
In light of the budget cuts in the public sector, grantmakers, particularly lottery 
distributors and distributors of other public funds, are under increasing pressure to 
deliver grants in the most cost-effective way possible.  There has been particular 
emphasis from Government on the need to reduce the amount of public money spent 
on administering grants and other running costs: in January 2011 the Department for 
Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) asked lottery distributors to cap their grant 
administration costs at five per cent, and reduce total running costs to eight 
per cent in line with best practice identified among charities carrying out similar 
activities.  
This directive from DCMS followed several Government research studies into the 
cost-effectiveness of grant making by lottery distributors.  In 2008 the National Audit 
Office (NAO) published a comprehensive study into the efficiency of grant making in 
the culture, media and sport sector23.  The research sought to identify the costs and 
main cost drivers of various lottery funding programmes.  It found that most grant-
makers had not developed cost-efficiency measures and those that did, did not do so 
through a consistent methodology.  Following the report the NAO (and subsequently 
the Public Accounts Committee24) recommended that Lottery grantmakers should 
collect information about the costs of grant making on a systematic basis, including 
agreed methods for measuring the costs of individual grant programmes.  More 
recently, in 2010, DCMS undertook their own comparative study of the administrative 
costs of some grant making charities to inform their decision about the level of the 
administrative cost caps for the Lottery distributors, although it should be noted that 
grant making charities included both salaried staff and volunteers whereas Lottery 
distributors do not. 
The remainder of this section considers a range of primary and secondary evidence 
on the costs of grantmaking, including outsourced grantmaking.  
5.2. Grantmaking costs 
The NAO study estimated two grantmaking cost metrics for a number of lottery grant 
programmes:  
 the direct staff cost of awarding a pound (£) of grant; and 
 the full cost (including overheads) of awarding a pound of grant. 
The analysis included a comparison of two broad categories of programme of 
relevance to this study: low value (average grant value of less than £30,000) open 
                                               
23
 National Audit Office (2008) Making grants efficiently in the culture, media and sport sector. Report by the 
Comptroller and Auditor General. 
24
 House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts (2008) Making grants efficiently in the culture, media and 
sport sector. Forty-ninth Report of Session 2007-08. 
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application programmes; and high value (average grant value of more than £100,000) 
open applications programmes. Each category included one Big Lottery programme 
and a number of programmes delivered by other Lottery distributors. An overview of 
the grantmaking costs identified is provided in table 5.1. 
Table 5.1: National Lottery grantmaking costs estimated by NAO 
 Direct staff cost 
(per £ of grant) 
Full overhead cost 
(per £ of grant) 
Low value open application programmes:   
Big Lottery Fund Awards for All 4 pence 7 pence 
Arts Council England Grants for the Arts for Organisations 4 pence 7 pence 
Arts Council England Grants for the Arts for Individuals 18 pence 35 pence 
High value open application programmes:   
Big Lottery Fund Reaching Communities (England) 1 penny 3 pence 
English Heritage Repair Grants for Places of Worship 4 pence 8 pence 
Sport England Community Investment Fund 3 pence 5 pence 
 
These costs can also be seen in the context of the costs incurred by other funders 
operating in the same field. Several examples are highlighted below. It should be 
noted that direct comparisons cannot be drawn between the costs cited in these 
examples and the figures estimated by the NAO due to the way individual 
grantmakers account for and apportion costs in their annual accounts. However, the 
figures identified below can be considered indicative of the full overhead cost per 
pound (£) of their grantmaking activity. 
a) The Esmee Fairbairn Foundation spends more than £20 million per year 
providing voluntary and community sector organisations. Their grant values 
range from less than £10,000 to more than £500,000. Between 2007 and 2010 
the Foundation consistently spent around 6 pence in support of grantmaking for 
every pound (£) awarded 
b) The Lloyds TSB Foundation (England and Wales) also spends more than 
£20 million per year on grants for voluntary and community organisations. Many 
of the grants they make are for sums of less than £50,000. Between 2007 and 
2010 the Foundation spent between ten pence and 11 pence in support of 
grantmaking for every pound awarded 
c) We also explored the grantmaking costs of a number of local Community 
Foundations spending between £1 million and £5 million per year on grants. 
Community Foundations generally provide voluntary and community 
organisations operating in their area with small grants (i.e. less than £50,000) in 
support of their activities. In 2010 the Community Foundations we looked at 
spent between 12 pence and 25 pence in support of grantmaking for every 
pound awarded. Compared to other grantmakers Community Foundations 
appeared to experience greater year-on-year fluctuations in their cost ratios 
compared to larger funders; this was primarily due to peaks and troughs in the 
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value of external funds they were distributing whilst their fixed (and some 
variable) costs remained largely the same. 
Although the costs of grantmaking are influenced by a range of factors and it is 
reasonable to expect these to vary by programme, the metrics estimated by the NAO 
and in the examples of other grantmakers we explored do highlight a number of 
possible trends: 
 it can cost more (per £) to administer lower value grants  
 it can cost more (per £) to administer lower (total) value grant programmes  
 it can cost more (per £) to administer grants to individuals compared to 
organisations 
 when compared other lottery distributors and grantmaking foundations operating 
in a similar field, the Big Lottery Fund's administrative costs appear reasonable 
and proportionate. 
These comparisons are helpful in framing further analysis and in understanding the 
economies of scale and scope BIG may have access to as the largest Lottery 
distributor. Nonetheless, as a rationale of outsourcing programmes is to purchase 
additional expertise, to reach harder to reach groups and individuals, and to innovate, 
it is likely that such economies may diminish. 
5.3. Outsourced grantmaking costs 
Estimating the costs of outsourced grantmaking is more complex than in-house 
grantmaking as programme development and operating/administrative costs are 
borne by two or more parties: that is, BIG and its delivery partners. It is further 
complicated by the fact that BIG's development and operational costs tend to be 
without the programme budget whereas partner costs tend to be within it. This is in 
addition to initial partner development costs which tend to be funded through an 
additional grant from BIG. This means that estimating direct staff and overhead cost 
per pound (£) metrics is more complicated for outsourced programmes. 
We were able to explore elements of these costs for a number of the outsourced 
programmes covered by this study. The findings are discussed in more detail below. 
5.3.1. Development costs 
For most outsourced programmes the chosen delivery partner receives a 
development grant from BIG to develop their business plan for the programme in 
more detail. Development grants are currently limited to £250,000. For example: 
 £80,000 was awarded to the Community Development Foundation for the 
development of the BIG Local Trust  
 £88,000 was awarded to the Scottish Community Foundation for the 
development of the JESSICA Trust 
 £188,000 was awarded to Life Changes Trust. 
In some cases partners identified the actual costs of programme development as 
greater than the development grant. 
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‘I've been working pro bono for 6 months!’  (The) Development grant was for 
£69k. If money had been twice what is was it would have been on track.’ 
(Portfolio Holder) 
However, not all were content that this represented an acceptable addition given the 
longer term benefits of delivering the programme: for instance one programme 
estimated that they had incurred a further £60,000 of costs in setting up a trust.  
Indeed, BIG is continually learning from these development processes. In Scotland 
the JESSICA Trust received an £88,000 development grant which was assessed, on 
reflection to have been too small. For example, in setting up the subsequent and 
more complex Life Changes Trust it was judged necessary to fund a Development 
Manager alongside other support, with the eventual development grant to require it 
was decided that a Development Manager would be needed, so the development 
budget was increased to £188,000. 
From BIG's perspective, these grants represent a small fraction (typically less than 
one per cent) of the overall programme costs, and represent necessary expenditure 
that BIG would most likely have incurred itself had the programmes been kept in-
house. 
5.3.2. BIG development and support costs 
In addition to the programme development costs incurred by its partners BIG also 
incurs costs during the development and delivery of an outsourced programme. For 
emerging programmes BIG estimates these costs through a generic template for 
developing an operating cost budget. The template covers estimated costs in the 
areas of programme development and set-up, programme management and 
resources, governance and overheads to enable an estimate of the total programme 
life costs. We were able to review these templates that had been developed for a 
number of outsourced programmes: 
 Space and Place had an estimated total programme life cost of £546,525 - 3.6 
per cent of the total programme budget (£15m) 
 Life Changes had and estimated total programme life cost of £362,780 - less 
than one per cent of the total programme budget (£50m)  
 Realising Ambition had an estimated total programme life cost of £486,287 - 
1.9 per cent of the total programme budget (£25m). 
This suggests that the cost to BIG of managing outsourced programmes is relatively 
low as a proportion of the total programme budget. However, it should be 
emphasised that these are cost estimates and projections made during the early 
stages of development, and the actual costs of associated with the programme may 
be quite different. For instance, the Lessons Learned paper for the Wellbeing 
Portfolio highlighted that although each portfolio has a single contract to the portfolio 
lead, monitoring data needed to be aggregated across the programme and 
compliance visits undertaken to all individual grant recipients with reports for each 
written.  
5.3.3. Programme delivery costs 
As with in-house programmes, the majority of the cost associated with outsourced 
programmes is incurred at the programme delivery stage. The partner(s) BIG 
chooses to deliver the programme through will have a series direct operational and 
administrative costs that will need to be drawn from the overall programme costs. 
Some examples of outsourced programme delivery costs are discussed below. 
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 the business plan for the Building Change Trust provided an estimate for the 
overall costs that would be incurred over the life of the Trust as well as the 
projected investment returns from the endowment. The £10 million ten year 
expendable endowment was expected to yield a total realisable capital of £12.1 
million (based on five per cent annual return net of fees, which may now seem 
optimistically high).  Set-up and running costs (including protector and audit 
costs) were estimated to be £1.439 million (14 per cent of the endowment), 
leaving £10.657 million, more than half a million more than the initial investment, 
available for spend 
 for the BIG Local Trust  the estimated budget (running costs) for the 
organisation (corporate trustee) is £7.3 million over ten years (3.7 per cent of the 
endowment) 
 of the Changing Spaces Award Partners RSWT estimate the overall 
administrative budget to be £6m over eight years - ten per cent of the funding 
provided by BIG (£57.5 million) 
 of the Changing Spaces Portfolios the Plunkett Foundation had a budget of 
£1.058 million for the management of the programme - 12 per cent of the 
funding provided by BIG (£9 million). Plunkett report that, broadly, these costs 
on budget so far but an overestimate in the legal and travel fees budgets has 
meant that they have been able to set up an additional delivery project (worth 
approximately £20,000) 
 the Fair Share Trust has £3.4 million programme management budget 
(corporate trustee) over ten years - 6.8 per cent of the £50 million endowment. 
However, this does figure not include costs incurred by local agents in 
administering grants. There are two further reflections here, firstly the Fair Share 
Trust raised a further £10 million in investment income which was reinvested in 
the programme, and some programme expenditure by local agents was for 
capacity building (non-grant activity) 
 the JESSICA Trust has projected running costs of approximately £1.8m - 12 
per cent of £15m endowment. 
5.3.4. Other outsourcing 
We were not able to identify many examples of other charitable funders outsourcing 
their grantmaking functions. However, a group of examples that do exist are some of 
the charitable Trusts linked to utilities companies, who outsource their grantmaking 
processes to private sector grant management specialists.  According to their 
accounts for the financial year ending 2010 these Trusts paid between 15 pence and 
25 pence on grant management fees for every pound (£) awarded. A further point to 
note is that these Trusts paid more for grant management as a proportion of grants 
in 2010 compared to previous years due to the increase in the rate of VAT to 20 per 
cent. This highlights that BIG's in-house and outsourced approaches are more cost 
efficient. 
5.4. Reflections on Costs 
The data on costs can be qualified by interviewee respondents. Three general sets 
of comments were made: 
 development costs incurred by partners in the development of outsourced 
arrangement were only partly met by BIG. As one respondent noted: 'I've been 
working pro bono for 6 months! [….] If the money had been twice what is was 
[the development grant] would have been on track.' 
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 delivery costs were generally seen to be reasonable, with one award partner 
noting: 'you get what you pay for' and with respect reducing administration  
costs 'less money results in lower quality [projects and fewer outcomes]' 
 working for BIG on previous programmes helped with development. As one 
award partner noted with respect to administration costs, 'these were relatively 
low, helped by the organisation's previous involvement with Lottery programmes 
and consequent knowledge of how the processes worked and what kinds of 
information were required. Although due diligence turned out to be a lengthy 
exercise, we did not see this as particularly onerous'. 
Development and Management Costs for the Jessica Trust, Scotland 
The running costs of the Trust are approximately 12 per cent, higher than BIG would normally 
pay, but the Trust will have more freedom to do its own evaluation and monitoring.  
The successful Scottish Community Foundation bid for JESSICA was for £88,000 in 
development costs, although it was noted that some of the unsuccessful bids had requested 
much more.  
The administration costs for BIG were seen to be low, requiring a programme manager, some 
administration time, and for grants officers to check the proposals. Committee time was not 
seen to be extensive. The programme manager committed approximately five days a month 
to developing the trust over approximately four months.  
 
The Trust model can enable the money to go further - in a number of examples the 
actual (e.g. Fair Share Trust) or projected (e.g. Building Change Trust) investment 
returns from the endowment would cover set-up and running costs. However, it is 
more difficult to understand the full range of costs associated with outsourced 
programmes, particularly where there are multiple award partners and portfolio 
holders, and ebbs and flows in programme spending mean value for money will only 
really become clear once the programme is complete. 
5.5. Conclusion 
Outsourced grantmaking is likely to result in greater operational costs than in-house 
delivery due to extra layers of administrative and other transactional costs involved. 
Moreover, there are not the economies of scale to reap as in in-house and 
mainstream programmes. However, there are exceptions to this, notably the £200 
million Big Local Trust which has lower proportionate costs than other Trusts. There 
is also a perverse incentive to outsource due to the current treatment of costs. 
Administrative costs incurred by partner organisations can be treated as programme 
and not operational expenditure and therefore mask the true cost delivering grants 
through this route. 
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6. Conclusion: lessons and recommendations 
The following conclusions can be drawn from the research study into outsourcing 
grant making: 
 actual costs of developing and delivering outsourced programmes were found 
to be higher than expected in many cases. This was for a variety of reasons, but 
key factors were to do with additional costs incurred following programme 
launch. Some of these could have been anticipated and addressed at the 
programme design stage. Costs incurred in the development stages by the 
outsourced partner were typically higher than those paid for through some form 
of development grant. However, outsourced partners in many cases gained 
wider benefits (and returns) from securing the contract to deliver the outsourced 
programme 
 relationship management was found to be an important component of 
effective delivery of outsourced grant making. BIG's practices in this field had 
evolved with a dedicated team in place for high value/low volume contracts. 
Nonetheless, there was considerable reflection on the implications of 'losing 
control' of grant making, to some extent in award partners and almost entirely in 
trusts. This is a repercussion of outsourcing 
 outsourcing grantmaking does not occur in a policy vacuum: it is 
undertaken in relation to existing organisations operating within policy 
fields. These organisations have self-interests in acting as outsourced partners 
to do with their own reputation and brand, furthering a particular issue, seeking a 
stronger market position, and in securing the resources being a partner 
provides. BIG's mission to address unmet needs requires wider engagement at 
different levels with other organisations 
 outsourcing arrangements are typically long term and may span 
programmes. This presents operational issues for BIG in terms of ensuring 
continuity in relationships and also in understanding the full life-cycle of 
outsourcing. This inevitably means at times the ending or exiting from 
relationships, and therefore the importance of both contracts but also contract 
management 
 there is an assumption that outsourcing brings access to expertise and with this 
the benefits of reach and innovation. Whilst evidence was found of both, this 
was not the case in all programmes. Some outsourced partners were found to 
have lacked the core competences required, notably around grant making 
systems. Innovation was not found to have occurred in all programmes. 
Outsourced partners enabled BIG to do things it might not be able to do in 
achieving its mission, for instance awarding grants to individuals, forms of social 
investment and support at the boundary between social and economic 
interventions. However, BIG is often able to innovate through in-house 
programmes and has more flexibility here to adapt programmes during delivery 
stages 
 outsourcing grant making provides BIG with a means to manage and 
forecast future expenditure. Trusts and Award Partners enable BIG to release 
funding in large tranches. Where it makes recurrent awards to a partner these 
can be done relatively quickly. However, trusts, for example, can take up to 
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three years to develop from inception to launch – not necessarily the most 
expedient way of reducing funding balances.  
 there is a diverse array of programmes delivered through outsourced 
grantmaking arrangements. Each has particular advantages as outlined below: 
 Trusts were found to bring BIG benefits in achieving its mission in terms of 
being able to address a need over the longer term (over five years) where a 
longer term commitment is required for change, being able to deliver 
activities which BIG cannot or would find it difficult to do (micro grants, 
loans and grants to individuals), campaigning and advocacy work for a 
disadvantaged group as a prerequisite to change for that group 
 Award Partners worked well where partner organisations had access to a 
particular group and technical expertise and/or support was required in 
grant application development and monitoring. Grant making expertise is 
also a pre-requisite (around systems, capacity and governance) of this 
 Portfolios do not involve BIG delegating grant making powers and were 
found to bring specific benefits in terms of networking and leverage of 
additional funds. They also allowed BIG to retain control over grant 
management 
 BIG has experienced some outsourced arrangements which have presented 
considerable challenges and it has drawn lessons from these, from evaluation 
evidence, Lessons Learned papers, and external audit. Typically, there was not 
a single factor which led to the programme causes challenges, although 
possibly programme development did not adequately test different delivery 
models or the capacity of external organisations to deliver programmes. A 
lesson to be drawn here is around the importance of robust programme 
development, which keeps to a minimum unresolved issues at programme 
launch, and which fully tests partner delivery capacity 
 a rationale for outsourcing is that it provides BIG with reach to groups with 
needs where its programmes could deliver outcomes. Reach may either be 
through expertise, through access and legitimacy, or through building capacity. 
Moreover, some outcomes were intermediate: for instance building capacity in a 
deprived community does not on its own address deprivation. Moreover, whilst 
the bottom-up approach of the Fair Share Trust and Big Local Trust may provide 
such intermediate outcomes, grant awards may not directed to achieved 
outcome change or indeed be sufficient for that outcome change. The concern 
here is that outsourcing grantmaking decisions need not just consider reach and 
outcomes, but also the likelihood and scale of impact 
 this research study does not provide a full evaluation of different models of 
outsourcing or a comparison with in-house delivery. It has provided an 
assessment of costs, appropriate processes, and where possible identified 
evidence of reach and outcomes. Whether the outcomes are additional to what 
would have been achieved through in-house delivery is unclear, particularly 
regarding the scale and value of these outcomes. The report outlines 
suggestions for how this might be addressed in the future.  
Based on these broad lessons from the research, the following recommendations for 
change in the future can be made: 
 BIG should continue to ensure that the capacity of partner organisations to 
deliver programmes, and where necessary to make grants, remains a central 
consideration in decisions to outsource. 
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 In deciding whether to outsource, BIG should undertake more explicit and formal 
consideration of questions of outcomes and impact, noting in particular 
assumptions and evidence about how outsourcing will enhance these. 
 BIG should work closely with partner organisations to ensure effective recording 
and sharing of lessons, evidence of performance, and progress towards 
outcomes and impact. Evaluations, monitoring information and stakeholder 
consultation and feedback are all of great value. BIG should work closely with 
partners to ensure that systems developed meet both BIG’s and partners’ 
needs. 
 Relationships between BIG and organisations running outsourced programmes 
are an essential factor for success and should be managed at three distinct 
levels: 
 customer relationship management at an operational level 
 continuing relationships with other functions, notably to manage BIG’s 
requirements in regard to such questions as branding, publicity, external 
relations and public accountability, and evaluation and learning; and 
 higher-level strategic relationships between BIG and its partners as to how 
Lottery funding can be most effectively used to deliver BIG's mission, 
involving senior staff on both sides. 
BIG should also ensure that there is appropriate internal communication to 
ensure consistent approaches. 
 BIG should ensure that it pays sufficient attention to relationship management 
throughout the lifecycle of outsourced approaches. To avoid risks to BIG’s 
reputation, it is particularly important to consider arrangements for programme 
closure and ending relationships. 
 all BIG staff involved in working with partners running outsourced programmes 
should be aware of the specific nature and boundaries of the arrangements in 
place. This is particularly important for staff working with Trusts, given the very 
different legal and working arrangements that they entail 
 BIG should define relationships with outsourcing partners more widely than 
through a narrow set of programme delivery issues. These relationships might 
best be seen as types of strategic alliances. 
 consideration about whether to outsource should explicitly consider such issues 
as BIG’s wider strategic role, reputation and brand. 
 BIG should make decisions about whether to outsource on the basis of evidence 
and documented considerations. Doing this requires input from BIG staff, 
committees and stakeholders. The software developed alongside this research 
study is a resource that will facilitate this process; its use should be promoted 
through the funding development framework. 
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Annex 1: Outline Details of Outsourced Programmes within Study Scope 
Programme Name Outsourcing 
Arrangement 
Programme 
Details 
 
  
Delivery Partner 
    Dates 
Award 
Budget 
Geographic 
Coverage 
Name 
Changing Spaces (Award Partners) Award Partner 2007 - 159,920,000 England Groundwork 
     
Royal Society for Wildlife Trusts 
     
Natural England 
     
BRE 
     
Mind 
Growing Community Assets  
Hybrid with features of 
Award Partner  
49,100,000 Scotland Highlands and Islands Enterprise 
Space and Place Award Partner 2012- 15,000,000 Northern Ireland In assessment 
The Big Boost Award Partner 2005-2008 10,000,000 England UnLtd 
The BIG Deal Award Partner 2006-2011 4,000,000 Northern Ireland Voluntary Youth Network for Northern Ireland (YouthNet) 
Research grants Delegated grant-making 2007-2009 25,000,000 UK Momenta 
Mentro Allan Non-standard portfolio 2006-2011 6,595,000 Wales Sports Council for Wales (lead organisation) 
Changing Spaces Portfolio Portfolio 2006 - 50,561,660 England Plunkett Foundation 
     
Places for People 
     
Imperial College London 
     
Crime Concern  
     
Field Studies Council 
Children’s Play Portfolio Portfolio 2007- 123,094,000 England Local authorities in England 
Community Voice Portfolio 2011- 12,000,000 Wales County Voluntary Councils 
Impact of Alcohol Portfolio 2011- 7,000,000 Northern Ireland In assessment 
International Strategic Portfolio 2009- 26,551,000 UK Six awards to NGOs as portfolio leads 
Realising Ambition Portfolio 2010- 25,000,000 UK Catch 22 
Supporting Voluntary Action  Portfolio 
 
8,400,000 Scotland SCVO 
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Well Being Portfolio 2006 - 160,000,000 England 10 regional and 7 England-wide portfolios 
Big Local  Trust 2010 -  200,000,000 England CDF led on the establishment of the Local Trust 
Building Change Trust Trust 2008 - 2018 10,000,000 Northern Ireland CFNI 
Fair Share Trust Trust 2003 - 2013 50,000,000 UK CFN 
Forces in Mind  Trust 2010 -  35,000,000 UK COBSEO 
JESSICA (Scotland) Trust Trust 2012- 15,000,000 Scotland Scottish Community Foundation 
Life Changes Trust Trust 2012- 50,000,000 Scotland Long Term Conditions Alliance 
Legacy Trust UK  Trust 2008-2012 40,000,000 UK UK Legacy Trust 
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Annex 2: Key Features and Lessons from Outsourced Grantmaking 
Programme Key Features of Programme Added Value of Partner(s) 
Changing Spaces 
(Award Partners) 
Wide range of environmental activities supported by five partner 
organisations: 
- Energy microgeneration in community buildings (BRE) 
- Creation and improvement of local green spaces (Groundwork) 
- Environmental activities involving people with mental health 
problems (Mind) 
- Improving access to and knowledge of natural environment 
(Natural England) 
- Improving accessibility and affordability of local food (RSWT) 
Mainly around existing involvement in specialist networks and prior engagement 
with community groups - this saved time and money in spreading the word and 
helped to quickly attract high volumes of applications  
Growing Community 
Assets 
This was a follow on programme from the Scottish Land Fund but 
extended to cover urban areas. The Award Partner was a 
consortium led by Highlands and Islands Enterprise (HIE). The 
focus of programme around developing and sustaining assets 
HIE had a track record as the award partner for the Scottish Land Fund. They 
were familiar with BIG's approach to funding, but with a limited track record in 
urban areas. Other organisations in the consortium had such expertise, This was 
not a standard Award Partner as the BIG Scotland Committee had decision-
making at stage 1 and 2. The contract was modified over three years with the size 
of the consortium reduced and assessment brought in-house to avoid the conflict 
of interest.  Development support and grant management remained with the 
Award Partner for the length of the contract.   
Space and Place This is a new programme being launched in 2012 with applications 
currently in assessment. Aim of the programme is to develop 
community spaces in deprived areas of Northern Ireland.  
Programme is not yet live. The original plan was to let 11 portfolio projects - one 
to each to a local authority following the planned reorganisation of local 
government in Northern Ireland. Local government reorganisation has now been 
delayed until 2015 and the decision was taken to use a single Award Partner 
instead of separate local authority level portfolios.  
The Big Boost The focus of this programme was to provide: grants to young people 
to support social entrepreneurship 
It was delivered by UnLtd (lead partner) in collaboration with Prices 
Trust, Scarman Trust and Changemakers 
At the time the Big Lottery Fund was not able to make grants to individuals, UnLtd 
provided mechanism to do that. UnLtd and partners brought expertise in working 
with young people, and networks in areas where Big had less presence 
The BIG Deal Award Partner Voluntary Youth Network for Northern Ireland 
(YouthNet) delivered the Programme. Strong support for the Award 
Partner model in consultation. 
Added value included: partner enabled innovation in grant making, particularly 
through involvement of young people in decision making panels; Young people 
welcomed opportunity to decide on award of small grants; and the award partner 
had reach into a wide range of youth related activities and specialist 
organisations. 
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Research grants Delivery of a grants programme to TSOs. Programme delivered by 
Momenta (grant management) with University of York (grant 
assessment), with further outsourcing of some delivery and grant 
assessment (Peer Review aspects) 
At bid stage, Momenta brought expertise in project management and York, 
expertise in coordinating peer review activities 
Mentro Allan There were 14 Mentro Allen projects across Wales running between 
2006 and 2011. The aim of the project was to learn about ways to 
increase the physical activity of sedentary people 
The project focussed on a range of target groups: young people, 
older people, women, BME communities, people with physical 
disabilities, mental health service users, carers, people at risk of 
rural isolation and people with low incomes. 
Locally developed and focused projects as part of a wider strategy helped with 
delivery.  
Changing Spaces 
Portfolio 
Wide range of specified environmental projects supported through 
five portfolios: 
- Green spaces and environmental improvements within 
communities delivered by young people at risk of ASB and crime 
(Catch22) 
- Residential courses on nature conservation and practical 
application in own neighbourhoods for young people (FSC) 
- Contribution to scientific knowledge through work on local green 
spaces (Imperial College) 
- Improved green spaces in social housing estates (Places for 
People) 
- Increased local participation in local food initiatives (Plunkett 
Foundation)  
Existing involvement of consortia and/or networks was important. It provided 
access to the appropriate technical knowledge and advice (e.g., on the ins and 
outs of the youth justice system, or in terms of establishing and running a social 
enterprise). Some evidence of partners extending links further into schools and 
communities through project activity. 
Children’s Play 
Portfolio 
Funding was made available on an allocation basis to local 
authorities in England. Each local authority was required to identify 
priorities for funding through a local Children's' Play strategy.  
The portfolio model enabled BIG to support local priorities in this field without 
having to assess individual projects. Monitoring through site visits allowed for 
checks to be made around consistency with local strategies and visits to new 
facilities. 
Community Voice The aim of the programme is to help build the capacity of citizens so 
that they are more able to engage in the planning and running of 
services and projects that respond to their communities’ needs and 
also advance community benefit.  The programme will fund 
portfolios of projects led by County Voluntary Councils (CVCs) in 
Wales.  CVCs are lead grant holders delivering 5-10 projects across 
an area, usually an LA.   
CVCs provide a bridging structure which can work effectively between the 
projects and statutory organisations. 
CVCs have all Wales coverage and are an established third sector support 
structure already represented on local service boards. 
CVCs help to enhance strategic impact of the programme and provide a 
mechanism for public voice - all Wales coverage, community control and 
ownership. 
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Realising Ambition Realising Ambition will focus support for young people at risk of 
offending. The programme aims to support the best projects that 
have already proven their effectiveness in diverting young people 
from crime.  It focuses on prevention in order to support young 
people at risk, helping them to realise their potential for a meaningful 
life and avoid pathways into offending.  The Programme is targeted 
at preventing/reducing youth offending for ages 8-14.   
BIG would not have been able to bring together partners that have been brought 
together under a portfolio model. 
Portfolio is built on the strength of partners, all of which have a specific 
understanding of the topic.   Rathbone do similar work as Catch 22 across 
Scotland, NI and Wales.  Dartington SRU - provide evidence based and social 
research expertise, Young Foundation - expertise re: replication, Substance - 
software and social research skills.   
All partners have relevant experience and Catch 22 have successfully delivered 
similar relevant programmes 
Well Being The Well Being Programme aimed to give money to communities in 
need to create healthier lifestyles and improve their wellbeing.  The 
Programme had three main areas: mental health, physical activity 
and healthy eating. There were 10 regional portfolios and 7 national 
ones. 
Enabled capacity building for partner organisations and increased reach of health 
care professionals in deprived areas.   
Portfolios help with 'bigger branding' - raising profile, helps projects to have an 
identifiable name of portfolio and aids referrals to the project/s.   
Provided short cuts for BIG in that they can link projects and programmes more 
effectively as they are more embedded in localities and particular policy/practice 
areas. 
Brought benefits to organisations as they are part of something bigger /part of a 
national movement. Examples include staff receive training and up-skilling.   
Portfolios invested a significant amount in programme management software / 
monitoring which has benefited partners. 
Have developed subsequent joint projects and bids and worked with other 
portfolios 
Big Local  Local Trust will invest £200 million in between 100-150 communities 
over a ten year period. Local Trust formed by the Community 
Development Foundation (CDF), with partners, to deliver the 
programme. The rationale of the programme is to support local 
communities to develop ideas and plans for funding. 
CDF, and partners, have expertise in local community development and brings 
together local partners in each area with capacity for local grant making as well as 
capacity building - these local organisations include infrastructure organisations, 
housing associations, councils, community foundations and schools.  
Building Change Trust A transformative grants scheme for the voluntary sector in Northern 
Ireland: 
- To identify community assets and needs  
- To design and target interventions  
- To build / strengthen / utilise capacity and assets  
- To capture positive change and replicate success 
 
Established networks, personal contacts, knowledge of the sector. 
Benefits for BCT- access to backroom services.  
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Fair Share Trust FST is a precursor to other trusts. Funds earmarked for 
disadvantaged areas with little history of successful BIG grant 
applications Programme about capacity building and grant giving 
Community Foundation Network and partners brought expertise and infrastructure 
to deliver the programme. Key aspect was around capacity building in deprived 
local communities 
Forces in Mind This programme has just been established and the trust formed. It 
seeks to build infrastructure in a sector in which little capacity exists 
at present.  
Forces in Mind is intended to have excellent connections across the third sector 
serving ex service people and their families. It therefore will be a centre for skills 
and knowledge in this area, something BIG could not develop. It is also not simply 
a grant making body but about the development of an effective sector, and that 
includes an advocacy and partnership role.  
JESSICA (Scotland) 
Trust 
The JESSICA (Scotland) Trust is targeted at 13 geographic 
neighbourhoods of greatest disadvantage in Scotland. It will be set 
up to invest in projects that create opportunities for local people and 
community-led organisations to develop locally owned, led and 
controlled assets that will lead to local regeneration.  The Trust will 
work with community anchor organisations, to better align the main 
European Union JESSICA fund and act as a vehicle by which 
money can be levered into communities.  The Trust will make a mix 
of loans and grants. 
Scottish Community Foundation will be the main Trustee and has a track record 
of delivering The BIG Lottery Fair Share Trust in Scotland. 
Experience of managing endowed funds. 
Life Changes Trust Life Changes Trust is about trying to bring about transformational 
change and improve outcomes for young people leaving care and 
also older people with dementia and their carers'.  An important part 
is that the Trust will be able to work with a range of different 
agencies providing services and influence practice.  It is anticipated 
that the programme is likely to make grants available/ payable to 
individuals.  The Trust will be able to pay out grants to individuals to 
help them to buy care or spend money to improve their 
circumstances etc.  
Partnership headed by the Long Term Conditions Alliance Scotland (LTCAS) and 
comprising of Long Term Conditions Alliance Scotland, Scottish Community 
Foundation, Glasgow Council for the Voluntary Sector, Who Cares? Scotland, 
was selected as the preferred candidate to set up the corporate trustee to run the 
Life Changes Trust.   
Legacy Trust UK - Delivery of London 2012 Legacy activities 
- Funded by BIG, DCMS, Millennium Commission and Arts 
Council England 
- It is time limited trust focused on London 2012 
- Strong links with regional partnerships (around Arts Council and 
RDAs) 
New organisation founded by funding partners with a focus on delivery of 
predetermined programmes (e.g. UK School Games and Cultural Olympiad) but 
also to grant fund local projects around a series of key themes. The organisation 
formed had no prior history of delivery. Delivery has been on target and success 
factors seen to be around well defined programme, strong networks and 
partnerships and staff capacity.  
 
 50 
Annex 3: Case Studies 
About the Programme 
Changing Spaces (Award Partners) 
Value: £160 million 
Timeframe: 2007-12 
Aims and objectives: Developed in response to the BIG Lottery Fund Consultation in 2004-
05, which identified a need to provide more funds for environmental related projects, it 
supported voluntary and community groups across England to develop projects that would 
improve communities and lives. 
Rationale and Approach to Outsourcing 
BIG selected five award partners from across the voluntary and community sector. Each 
award partner was regarded as leading light in their particular field and considered to have 
the skills and experience to necessary run an effective environmental programme on BIG's 
behalf. The Award Partner approach was managed through an external delegation 
agreement (EDA) where the successful award partners developed entire programmes, 
including responsibility for the assessment, decision-making and management of the grants 
on behalf of BIG. 
Each organisation ran an England wide, open grants programme based around a particular 
theme. In total 2,331 projects were funded: 
 the Community Sustainable Energy programme, run by Building Research 
Establishment, funded community based organisations to install renewable energy 
sources and energy saving measure. Development grants of up to £5,000 and capital 
grants of up to £50,000 were provided 
 the Community Spaces programme, run by Groundwork UK, supported community 
groups to improve local green spaces including play areas, community gardens, parks, 
wildlife areas and village greens. Main grants ranged from £10,000 to £49,999 with a 
small number of larger grants of up to £450,000 also provided 
 the Ecominds programme, run by Mind, supported projects that encouraged people 
with experience of mental distress to get involved in environmental projects, including 
improving open spaces and wildlife habitats, designing public art and recycling. Small 
grants of up to £20,000 and larger grants of up to £250,000 were provided 
 the Access to Nature programme, run by Natural England, supported projects that 
encouraged people to learn more about and enjoy the natural environment. It funded 
projects in urban, rural and coastal communities with aim of reaching people who had 
little or no contact with nature. Grants ranged from £50,000 to £500,000 with a small 
number of larger grants will be provided to projects with a national significance 
 the Local Food programme, run by the Royal Society of Wildlife Trusts, funded 
organisations to deliver a variety of food related projects that aimed to make locally 
grown food more accessible and affordable to local communities. Grants ranged from 
£2,000 to £300,000 with a small number of larger grants of up to £500,000 also 
provided. 
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Further potential Award Partner programmes did not proceed after not being approved in 
BIG’s due diligence process. 
The Award Partner model was considered appropriate because of each partner's 
involvement in existing specialist networks and capabilities around grantmaking. It was felt 
that this would save time and money when promoting the programme and would generate a 
higher volume of applications more quickly.  
Value for Money 
RSWT estimate the overall administrative budget to be £6m over eight years - ten per cent 
of the funding provided by BIG (£57.5 million). No cost info was provided by the other APs. 
The RSWT costs are assumed to be indicative of the other Award Partners.  
Reach and Outcomes 
There has not been a full programme evaluation of Changing Spaces meaning there isn't 
any programme evidence regarding reach and outcomes. However the Award Partners have 
all undertaken evaluations of their particular programmes and these provide some useful 
insights into the types of outcomes achieved. The nature of the outsourcing arrangements 
(five separate Award Partners) enabled the Changing Spaces programme to be accessed by 
a wide range of voluntary and community organisations and funded projects benefiting a 
diverse range of social groups.   
Knowledge and Expertise 
As BIG and its predecessors had limited experience of funding environmental projects the 
rationale for outsourcing grantmaking was clear. Each Award Partner brought specific 
knowledge and experience of a particular aspect of environmental activity or beneficiary 
group and was able to administer their individual programmes more effectively than BIG 
could have.  
Lessons 
The Changing Spaces Award Partner programme highlights how organisations with prior 
experience of grantmaking, either through their own funds or on behalf of others (including 
the Lottery) can in theory 'hit the ground running' and make funding programmes operational 
quickly. However, in this case due diligence took longer than BIG estimated and as a result 
the launch was delayed by 18 months. There are further potential issues for the Award 
Partner model if the contracted body undergoes reorganisation or merger during the delivery 
process. 
More generally the Changing Spaces programme as a whole does also raise one note of 
caution. That is, the danger that by utilising existing networks of specialism or expertise, 
funding is awarded to the 'usual well connected suspects' at the expense of less high profile 
but possibly more innovative providers.  
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About the Programme 
The Big Boost 
Value: £10 million 
Timeframe: 2005-08 
Aims and objectives: The Big Boost was an Award Partner programme involving four 
charities that work with young people and social entrepreneurs: UnLtd (the Award Partner) 
worked with three delivery partners - Changemakers, The Scarman Trust and The Prince's 
Trust - to deliver a creative and flexible programme to support young social entrepreneurs 
through two age groups (11-16s and 16-25s). The aims and objectives were aligned with 
three areas of the Every Child Matters framework: being healthy, being safe and enjoying 
and achieving. 
Rationale and Approach to Outsourcing 
The Big Boost Programme had two strands through which 3,263 individual grants were 
awarded: 
 Grants of £250 to £500 for young people aged 11-15 
 Grants of £500 to £5,000 for young people 16-25.  
There was an additional top-up awards scheme which provided up to £10,000 living 
expenses for projects which could be scaled-up successfully to become viable businesses. 
BIG was unable to deliver this programme directly as it was not (at the time) able to make 
grants to individuals. BIG also does not have a track record in supporting social enterprise 
and entrepreneurship. It therefore needed an Award Partner with ability and experience in 
making grants to individuals, including young people, and had a track record in supporting 
social enterprise development. 
Furthermore, it was felt that delivery of the programme in-house would have incurred costs 
for BIG at a time when the organisation was restructuring - there would have been a need to 
train staff and to conduct enhanced CRB checks. By contrast the delivery partners had staff 
in place who were already trained and experienced in working with young people. It was also 
felt that the delivery partners had presence and existing networks in regions where BIG was 
(at the time) less active. 
Value for Money 
The Big Boost had relatively high delivery costs (26 per cent of the budget). Of the £10 
million budget £7.3 million was allocated to third party grants. The remainder of the 
programme budget was delivery costs and write-offs which included around £1.99 million for 
development, the learning and evaluation contract, and monthly funding panels; and £614 
thousand for management (direct staff) costs. 
However it is important to note that these delivery costs were considered acceptably high 
give the nature and risks of the programme. In particular having two separate grant 
programmes and monthly decision-making panels (rare for Big programmes) meant that 
financial management needed more resource than other externally delegated programmes. 
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Reach and Outcomes 
An independent evaluation of the Big Boost identified the most significant positive impact on 
Award Winners as increased self-confidence. For many, the Big Boost had helped to open 
doors, leading to new opportunities, including further training, employment or a future career, 
and young people from disadvantaged groups were found to have experienced the greatest 
benefits.  
More generally grant recipients were found to have developed trust in others, personal self-
esteem and self-belief. They felt affirmed and good about themselves and their ability to 
work on their own initiative. Many noted the new experiences which enabled them to achieve 
things previously out of reach, meeting new friends, making networks and new contacts. 
Whilst most people indicated overall positive impact on their lives as a consequence of the 
Big Boost, some had experienced frustration, and there was a very small number for whom 
the project was negative.  
In addition, the Big Boost was found to have raised awareness in communities, increased 
networking and contact within communities, between the young people engaged in projects 
and between agencies. Grant recipients learned to appreciate the value of the community, of 
helping others, and how this could contribute to cohesion and understanding of community. 
The evaluation found that much of the community focussed work will continue and that a 
significant number of young people had not taken part in a community project before.  
Knowledge and Expertise 
The Award Partner (UnLtd) is one of the leading national bodies supporting social enterprise 
and entrepreneurship. They specialise in providing financial and practical support to social 
entrepreneurs in the early stages of developing a social enterprise. Their delivery partners 
brought additional expertise in the areas of youth enterprise (Prince's Trust, Scarman Trust) 
and leadership (Changemakers). Collectively they possessed knowledge and expertise 
necessary to deliver the programme effectively that was not readily available from within BIG 
has it been delivered in-house.  
Lessons 
This case study suggests there is a need in some cases for BIG to retain some influence on 
decision making within Award Partners to ensure that grants will have some form of social 
benefit. Decision making panels often did not think through the balance between the 
financial (social enterprise) viability and social benefits of funding applications.  
The Big Boost also highlighted the need to ensure that administrative systems are 
consolidated at an early stage in the process, and for this to be accompanied by a good 
understanding of each party's respective roles and boundaries.  
A further lesson to emerge from this case study involves the importance of effective one-to-
one support when making grants to individuals, and resourcing this appropriately. There is 
evidence from the Big Boost that cost to delivery partners working in deprived communities 
were underestimated.  
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About the Programme 
Changing Spaces (Portfolio) 
Value: £50.5 million 
Timeframe: 2007-12 
Aims and objectives: Developed in response to the BIG Lottery Fund Consultation in 2004-
05, which identified a need to provide more funds for environmental related projects, it 
supported voluntary and community groups across England to develop projects that would 
improve communities and lives. 
Rationale and Approach to Outsourcing 
BIG selected five organisations to manage a portfolio of environmental projects. Each 
portfolio holder was regarded had a high profile in their particular field and was considered to 
have the skills and experience to necessary run an effective environmental programme on 
BIG's behalf.  
Each organisation managed a portfolio of projects based around a particular theme. In total 
194 projects were funded: 
 Crime Concern Trust (now Catch 22) was awarded £8.3 million for projects that involve 
young people at risk of offending in locally based environmental activities 
 Field Studies Council was awarded £2 million to projects that aimed to inspire young 
people, following a short residential trip, to take a more active role in environmental 
projects in their areas 
 Imperial College was awarded £11.7 million to develop the Open Air Laboratories 
Network (OPAL), which aimed encourage communities to work with leading scientists to 
study natural habitats in their local area 
 Places for People was awarded £15.8 million to provide high quality, accessible green 
spaces for communities living in social housing 
 Plunkett Foundation was awarded £10 million to increase people’s opportunities to 
grow and buy good quality, healthy, local food. 
The Portfolio model was considered appropriate because each partner was involved in 
existing specialist networks that enabled them to collaborate and develop a range of 
appropriate projects and involve smaller, specialist organisations that might not have applied 
to an open funding programme.  
Value for Money 
Plunkett Foundation had a budget of £1.058m for the management of the programme - 12 
per cent of the funding provided by BIG (£9m). Plunkett report that, broadly, these costs 
were on budget but an overestimate in the legal & travel fees budgets has meant that they 
have been able to set up an additional delivery project (worth approximately £20k). No cost 
info was provided by the other portfolios. 
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Reach and Outcomes 
There has not been a full programme evaluation of Changing Spaces meaning there isn't 
any programme evidence regarding reach and outcomes. However some Portfolio holders 
have undertaken evaluations of their particular programmes and these provide some useful 
insights into the types of outcomes achieved. The nature of the outsourcing arrangements 
(five separate Portfolios) enabled the Changing Spaces programme to be delivered through 
a wide variety of special and non-specialist organisations and funded projects benefiting a 
diverse range of social groups.  
Knowledge and Expertise 
As BIG and its predecessors had limited experience of funding environmental projects the 
rationale for outsourcing grantmaking was clear. Each Portfolio holder brought specific 
knowledge and experience of a particular aspect of environmental activity or beneficiary 
group and was able to administer their groups of projects more effectively than BIG could 
have done through a more traditional grantmaking approach.  
Lessons 
The Changing Spaces portfolio demonstrates that where organisations have existing links 
and networks, and partnerships forged based on trust, portfolios can harness input from 
specialist bodies which might not have applied for funding under an open grant programme. 
A further lesson from this case study is that having a central body managing the portfolio 
enables providers to focus on specialist activities link to their expertise, rather than overall 
programme or grant management. 
More generally the Changing Spaces programme as a whole does also raise one note of 
caution. That is, the danger that by utilising existing networks of specialism or expertise, 
funding is awarded to the 'usual well connected suspects' at the expense of less high profile 
but possibly more innovative providers. 
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About the Programme 
Well-being Portfolios 
Value: £160 million 
Timeframe: Since 2006 
Aims and objectives: The Well-being Programme aimed to support the development of 
healthier lifestyles and improve well-being, supporting projects across England focusing on 
three strands: healthy eating; physical activity; and mental health.  
Rationale and Approach to Outsourcing 
The programme was implemented through seventeen portfolios of projects, ten of which 
were cross-cutting regional portfolios and seven of which were England-wide. The portfolios 
were mainly led by charities and statutory organisations in the health sector. 
The portfolio approach was considered the most appropriate model through which to achieve 
strategic impacts on well-being. By funding groups of projects with collective aims and 
objectives that had been developed in response to identified need, BIG believed it would be 
able provide its funding more effectively and have greater impact than through an open 
grants programme. 
Value for Money 
The portfolio model was considered a comparatively cost effective way of delivering Well 
Being Programme.  BIG only needed a small team of grant officers to run the Programme (5 
at its height, now 3.5) and so offered a low staff to grant making cost ratio.  Individual 
portfolio management costs were between 10-15 per cent. 
However, the on-going monitoring costs of the programme for BIG were initially quite 
intensive. It was a high profile programme and involved detailed quarterly meetings with 
Portfolio leads and a high number of compliance visits to individual projects.  This intensity 
eased as the programme developed and became associated with risks associated with 
project. 
Reach and Outcomes 
A programme wide impact evaluation deployed a consistent approach to measuring well-
being across a sample of projects: overall, well-being across the three strands was found to 
have improved significantly for many participants. Furthermore, the scale and scope of the 
portfolio activities ensured that people from a wide range of social, demographic and 
geographic backgrounds were able to access the programme. 
Knowledge and Expertise 
Portfolio holders were selected on the basis on their position within thematic or geographic 
(regional) areas. They were able to build on existing links and networks develop a series of 
strategically linked projects in response to identified needs. It seems unlikely that BIG would 
have been able to procure such strategic benefits from an open programme that invited 
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applications from individual projects. It was also intended that portfolios would work across 
the three priority areas where possible and form new partnerships to do so. 
Lessons 
The national impact evaluation was an important feature of the programme but it was set up 
after the programme had begun, so portfolio partners were not clear about monitoring and 
evaluation processes at the outset. 
Portfolio leads did not always consider the full costs and risks associated with projects and 
the implications if individual projects failed. There were also instances where the portfolio 
leads had not fully considered their responsibilities associated with monitoring project 
performance and other management functions. 
For some portfolios the lack of transitional funding, and the absence of clear and upfront 
communication from BIG on this matter proved problematic, particularly when it came to 
developing exit and sustainability strategies. 
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About the Programme 
Children's Play Portfolio 
Value: £123 million 
Timeframe: Since 2007 
Aims and objectives: The Children’s Play Portfolios formed part of BIG's £155 million 
Children’s Play initiative, which was developed from the recommendations of the 2004 play 
review, Getting Serious About Play, carried out under the chairmanship of Frank Dobson 
MP. It also responded to a number of wider policy agendas including the Every Child Matters 
outcomes framework, the Children Act 2004, the ‘Change for Children, Choosing Health’ and 
‘Cleaner, Safer, Greener’ programmes and policies, and the Best Play report. Portfolios were 
developed with the aim to: 
 create, improve and develop children and young people’s free local play spaces and 
opportunities throughout England, according to need 
 promote the long-term strategic and sustainable provision for play as a free public 
service to children 
 ensure that local authorities work with other local stakeholders to develop children’s 
play strategies and plans 
 ensure that good, inclusive and accessible children’s play services and facilities are 
provided locally. 
Rationale and Approach to Outsourcing 
The programme required local authorities to work with local stakeholders to develop 
children’s play strategies for their areas and develop a portfolio of projects that responded to 
the needs identified in those strategies. Funding was allocated to all single tier and district 
council areas in England. 
Portfolios were expected to address strategic aims through a number of individual projects, 
delivered at a number of locations, which together formed a cohesive strategy to deliver the 
programme outcomes. Local authorities were able to deliver the individual projects 
themselves or sub-contract some or all of the delivery to other organisations. 
The portfolio model enabled BIG to support local priorities in this field without having to 
assess individual project proposals at a local level. Regular monitoring, for example through 
site visits, enabled checks to be made around consistency with local strategies.  
Value for Money 
The Children's Play Portfolios have relative low management costs when compared to other 
outsourced programmes. To date, the management fees paid out to portfolio holders 
account for 5.75 per cent of total programme expenditure. It should be noted that 
approximately 50 per cent of programme expenditure was capital, and it is likely that this 
was a key factor in keeping management costs low. 
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Reach and Outcomes 
The Children's Play programme evaluation underlines that funding was targeted to achieve 
an impact in quite specific ways, rather than simply providing a net additional amount of 
funding for the play sector. This was achieved through the design of the programme criteria 
and monitoring, and the requirement for local authorities to develop a Play Strategy to unlock 
the funding. The level of additionality was therefore considered to be high, and the 
evaluation concludes that the BIG investment procured a range of benefits with strong 
triangulation between the research literature, survey and project self-evaluation data, and 
children’s own accounts about what had been achieved. In particular, as a result of 
participating in play provision funded by BIG, children routinely gained in independence, 
boosted their self-esteem, participated in creative and expressive learning, and engaged 
with peers from different social and ethnic backgrounds and age groups. 
Knowledge and Expertise 
As portfolio holders, local authorities were naturally placed to develop and co-ordinate 
groups of area level projects particularly given the importance of linking to wider policy and 
strategy, much of which was implemented through local authority structures.   
Lessons 
The policy agenda has moved on since the programme was developed, and local children's 
play facilities are no longer a feature of government priorities. It is therefore unlikely that a 
similar approach would be used for future programmes, as there will not be common 
requirements at a local authority level. 
Local authorities were found to have robust systems for monitoring project expenditure but 
measurement of outcomes and impact was largely absent, and left to the programme wide 
evaluation to assess. 
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About the Programme 
Building Change Trust 
Value: £10 million 
Timeframe: 2008-18 
Aims and objectives: The Building Change Trust has been established to help develop and 
shape the future of Northern Ireland's voluntary and community sector. It has several 
strategic objectives: 
 to identify community assets and needs  
 to design and target interventions  
 to build / strengthen / utilise capacity and assets  
 to capture positive change and replicate success. 
Rationale and Approach to Outsourcing 
The Trust model was chosen as it enabled BIG to invest in a programme of transformative 
activity over a ten year period (i.e. longer than a traditional grant programme). It also 
enabled more risky and innovative approaches to funding provision, such as a self-
sustaining loan fund. The Trust was formed with the involvement of five key 
umbrella/infrastructure organisations in Northern Ireland: 
 the Community Foundation for Northern Ireland as Corporate Trustee 
 Community Evaluation Northern Ireland  
 Rural Community Network  
 Volunteer Development Agency  
 Business in the Community (NI). 
The Trust anticipates meeting its aims by expending the Trust funds in three main ways: 
 through direct support: the Trust will carry out some pieces of work itself, commission 
other pieces of work and/or support pilot initiatives 
 through transformative grants: the five original bid partners are in receipt of the first 
transformative grants and lessons from their projects will inform future activity 
 through a loan fund: a permanent loan fund has been established with a £2 million one 
off grant - managed by Charity Bank. 
Value for Money 
The business plan for the Building Change Trust provided an estimate for the overall costs 
that would be incurred over the life of the Trust as well as the projected investment returns 
from the endowment. The £10m ten year expendable endowment was expected to yield a 
total realisable capital of £12.1m (based on 5 per cent annual return net of fees).  Set up and 
running costs (including protector and audit costs) were estimated to be £1.439m (14 per 
cent of the endowment), leaving £10.657m, more than half a million more than the initial 
investment, available for spend. 
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Reach and Outcomes 
Although the Trust is in the early stages of delivery some deadline evaluation findings have 
emerged after three years: 
 the development of the Trust Model has facilitated increased capacity within the Trust 
partners 
 Partnerships have been developed and supported within the Trust and between 
sectors, including the private sector 
 the Trust Model has enabled the sector to link to policy priorities, including the Review 
of Public Administration (RPA) and the Big Society. 
However, the evaluation emphasises that it is too early to conclude whether the funding 
provided through the Trust has had a transformational impact on the sector and 
disadvantaged communities in NI. Conclusions regarding how effective and efficient the 
model is in terms of a support mechanism sector cannot be provided at this stage. However, 
early indications suggest that there is a both need and a demand for the services being 
offered, evidenced through high attendance.  
Knowledge and Expertise 
As the Building Change Trust was established to help develop and shape the future of 
Northern Ireland's voluntary and community sector it was necessary to involve the main 
umbrella and infrastructure bodies in the development and operation of the Trust. Their 
collective experience in grantmaking, capacity building and community development 
provides the Trust with greater reach than through BIG's own presence in the province. 
Lessons 
The Building Change Trust provides an example of how outsourcing can be used to invest in 
a wider strategy as opposed to specific project activity. As such it is supporting themes of 
activity and work streams rather than a predetermined set of projects. This should enable the 
trust to respond to need flexibly throughout its duration. 
It took a considerable time for Trust partners to develop the relationships necessary to form 
the Trust and agree on strategic priorities.  
In addition, in the beginning it was hard for some stakeholders to distinguish BCT form CFNI. 
CFNI was a well-established organisation well known in the sector with its own endowment 
and range of programmes. By contrast BCT was new and is considered by many to be within 
the wider CFNI portfolio. However there are signs that this perception is now changing. 
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About the Programme 
Fair Share Trust 
Value: £50 million 
Timeframe: 2003-13 
Aims and objectives: Part of the wider Fair Share initiative which was launched in 
response to concerns that the distribution of Lottery funds had left some areas behind, 
denying them their ‘fair share’. The Fair Share Trust was originally developed by the New 
Opportunities Fund, before it merged with the Community Fund to become the Big Lottery 
Fund (BIG).  
Fair Share identified specific local authority areas across the UK for targeted funding 
(although in Northern Ireland it focused on wards). These areas had received comparatively 
less Lottery funding, despite relatively high levels of deprivation. Many also had weak 
partnership working within and between statutory and voluntary sector organisations, under-
developed infrastructure and a strong dependency culture. 
The Community Foundation Network (CFN) was appointed as the Corporate Trustee for the 
Fair Share Trust in 2003. The three overall aims for the Trust are to: 
 build capacity and sustainability in local communities, including support for community 
assets and planning, and involvement in regeneration 
 build social capital, including support for social enterprises, local time banks, 
Intermediate Labour Market schemes and training 
 improve local environments, enabling communities to make them safer, healthier, 
greener, cleaner, better designed, more welcoming and accessible to all groups (the 
liveability agenda). 
Rationale and Approach to Outsourcing 
Following legal advice, NOF determined that an independent trust should be set up to 
manage the investment of £50 million as an expendable endowment. A Trust Deed was 
recommended to provide greater assurance that the Fund’s investment would be secured for 
the purposes set out.  
An endowment fund was regarded as the best option because it would enable the interest 
earned on the £50 million to be re-invested into the scheme. Furthermore, once the money 
has been paid into the trust fund, it was, in effect, independent of the Lottery. On this basis, 
the funding would be available for distribution to Fair Share areas for the whole life of the 
programme, and would be unaffected by any future changes in the operation of the UK 
Lottery and the distribution of funding to good causes. 
Value for Money 
The Fair Share Trust has a £3.4 million programme management budget (with CFN as the 
Corporate Trustee) over ten years – 6.8 per cent of the £50 million endowment. However, 
this figure does not include costs incurred by local agents in administering grants, and it 
should be noted that some programme expenditure by local agents was for capacity building 
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(i.e. non-grant activity, but directly mentioned in the aims of the trust) 
The Fair Share Trust programme also demonstrates the ability of the Trust model to make 
Lottery money 'work harder': through the expendable endowment the Fair Share Trust raised 
a further £10 million in investment income, money which was reinvested in the programme 
and more than sufficient to cover the costs of administering the programme.  
Reach and Outcomes 
The independent evaluation of the Fair Share Trust concluded that the ‘alternative’ routes to 
procurement developed achieved things which a straight open grant programme could not. 
In addition, in the process meant that the grant making could be strategic as well as local. 
Benefits of the FST approach to procurement included joined-up delivery by projects in 
support of locally understood strategic aims and less duplication of services; and increased 
capacity in organisations to attract other sources of funding and develop better relationships 
with grant makers/other funders.  
Knowledge and Expertise 
CFN was solicited by the New Opportunities Fund to become the Corporate Trustee for the 
Fair Share Trust. CFN offered experience of managing trust funds established to support 
community development projects in deprived areas, and as a membership organisation for 
local Community Foundations, had access to a network of grant-distributing bodies with 
close ties to the communities to which the funding was targeted.  
Lessons 
As the first Trust the Fair Share Trust provided a model subsequent Trusts. The evolution of 
the Trust model should therefore be understood in this context. 
A key lesson from the Fair Share Trust experiences is the level and importance of 
relationship management: this was underestimated by BIG, NOF and CFN and has led to 
complications during the course of the programme. Notable tensions have included the 
visibility of BIG within the branding of the programme and accessibility of programme 
information and data (to ensure the wider public accountability of Lottery funds). However, it 
is important to ensure a balance between the level and frequency of information required 
and providing Trusts with the flexibility to deliver the programme. 
The Fair Share Trust also demonstrates the ability of the Trust model to use the investment 
returns generated through an expendable endowment to support additional programme 
activity and/or cover programme deliver costs. 
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About the Programme 
Legacy Trust UK 
Value: £40 million 
Timeframe: 2008-12 
Aims and objectives: The Legacy Trust UK was set up in 2007 to support communities and 
organisations across the UK to create projects that celebrate London 2012 in a way that is 
relevant to them and which will leave a lasting legacy. It funds 16 programmes with over 100 
arts, sports and education projects currently taking place across the UK.  
The Trust is a Principal Funder of the Cultural Olympiad and London 2012 Festival. The 
projects it has funded are wide-ranging, but share three key aims: 
 to unite culture, sport and education, in line with the values and vision of the Olympic 
and Paralympic Games 
 to make a lasting difference to all those involved 
 to be grassroots projects, often small in scale, and unite communities of interest at local 
and regional level. 
The Trust has allocated funding through twelve regional and four national programmes. In 
addition to BIG funds (£29 million), funding has been contributed by Department for Culture 
Media and Sport (£6 million for UK School Games) and Arts Council England (£5 million). 
Rationale and Approach to Outsourcing 
A Trust was formed by the four main sponsoring organisations. This approach meant that 
each organisation was creating a new organisation rather than vesting responsibility and 
funding in one of the other funders. The clear timescale for delivery (by the Olympics) meant 
that there was a preference for delivery through an independent organisation.  
Value for Money 
Support and governance costs have been under £500,000 in each year of operation and this 
in the most recent year, 2010-11 amounts to less than five per cent of the £11 million 
expenditure. By contrast in the 2009-10 year expenditure was around £3.8 million, and 
governance and support costs were around 12 per cent.  Investment income for the two 
most recent financial years has been £1.07 million (2009-10) and £0.56 million (2010-11). 
Investment income has been used to increase programme expenditure and suggests 
considerable value for money for this trust. It was noted that by working through external 
networks, operating costs have been able to be kept low. 
Reach and Outcomes 
Since 2008, Legacy Trust projects have reached audiences of 4.5 million, directly engaged 
over 500,000 children and young people, worked with over 15,000 volunteers and created 
an economic impact of £35 million. 
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Knowledge and Expertise 
Legacy Trust is an independent trust established by the four funding partners. It recruited 
staff to the trust and they brought expertise in grant making combined with knowledge of the 
field. However, it placed considerable emphasis on working in partnership, notably through 
regional partnerships responsible for the selection of projects. These partnerships brought 
together established networks in each region. This partnership working was mirrored in 
approaches at a national level, for instance in funding the UK School Games and the 
Cultural Olympiad.  
Lessons 
This Trust is very focussed around a particular issue/event (London 2012) and a 
predetermined set of activities. There are therefore lessons about the benefits of the Trust 
model in delivering a tightly defined programme that has the commitment of a group of 
funding bodies. 
As a large part of the programme is being delivered at a regional level, and English Regional 
Development Agencies (RDAs) were a key delivery partner, the abolition of RDAs in 2009 
could have been problematic.  However, this has not represented a significant problem, 
partly because other key partners were subsequently identified. 
The Legacy Trust also saw itself as taking a risk taking approach, notably in using grant 
funding to unlock the contributions of partner organisations.  
 
